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Migration is currently an area of vast scientific research, public debate and policy 
intervention in Europe. This is the case when the object under analysis is international 
migration and, more specifically, immigration, i.e., international movements of people 
targeting the European societies – the object of the present report. The reasons for the 
centrality of this theme are numerous. On the one hand, migratory movements, which 
were always part of the European history, became increasingly visible in most 
European countries. Taken in the sense of international migration, they were never as 
large as they are today. On the other hand, they defy some of the entrenched 
principles in which cultures and identity lie. The settlement of populations with 
different national backgrounds, cultures, religions and values defy the notion of ethnic 
homogeneity in which the European identities are (mistakenly) based. The themes of 
international migration and social change do not come across very often in social 
research. However, it may be argued that international flows are nowadays one of the 
biggest sources of social change in Europe. 
 
The literature produced on the theme is countless. In the early stages of immigration 
in Europe, most of the studies were produced in Western countries, usually adopting a 
national perspective. With the enlargement of the migration realm, Northern, 
Southern and Central European countries became involved, each of them also 
producing an abundant national research. With the time, an increasing volume of 
cross-country research was produced, much as a consequence of European Union (EU) 
funding opportunities and academic networking. All in all, a vast amount of research 
has been produced on these topics, displaying a wide geographic and thematic variety. 
Although the better known studies come from the largest countries in Europe, being 
written in the dominant scientific languages (mostly English), many other were 
produced in the framework of other countries and languages. 
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Taking into account these considerations, the current state of the art must be 
considered as a general and incomplete overview of research on immigration in 
Europe. Given the scope and maturity of migration studies, the long period in which 
relevant flows took place, the many countries and scientific communities involved, and 
the many interrelated themes, it is virtually impossible to carry out an extensive 
evaluation of the research carried out in the field. For the purpose of the current 
report, this exercise was still more unfeasible given the short amount of time and 
resources allocated to the task – even knowing that only research produced from the 
1990s was to be taken into account 4. 
 
The methodology adopted for producing this report took into account the vast 
extension of the field and the resources available. Firstly, some major general studies 
on migration in Europe, including previous states of the art, were reviewed. This was 
the case of works such as Castles and Miller (2003 and 2009), Penninx, Berger and 
Kraal (2006), Spencer and Cooper (2007), Penninx, Spencer and Van Hear (2008), 
Portes and DeWind (2008), Bonifazi et al. (2008) and Okolski (forthcoming). The work 
of Penninx and colleagues (2006) was particularly relevant for this purpose, as it 
condensed the collective effort of several European researchers, gathered in IMISCOE 
(International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion), an European Network of 
Excellence in migration studies created in the framework of the European Commission 
(EC) research funding; its objective was presenting a detailed state of the art of 
European research in several migration domains 5. Secondly, some relevant databases 
and websites were consulted. This was the case of the EC research site 6, where cross-
national European research projects are presented; the IMISCOE website 7, condensing 
the more recent production in this framework; international organisations websites, 
such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM); and some relevant journals 
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and publishers websites. Finally, some bibliographic databases were checked, but 
mainly to fill some gaps resulting from the previous steps. 
 
The objective of the current report is presenting the main research lines, theoretical 
discussions and controversial issues existing about immigration in the European 
framework and, particularly, in the EU since the 1990s. As stated previously, it only 
deals with international migration and, particularly, immigration, dealing with both 
inflows and integration – two subjects sometimes separated in research. Besides this 
first introductory section, the second section presents the framework, i.e., a brief 
history of immigration in Europe and some relevant statistical data. The third section 
summarizes the research, structured around three main themes: a thorough exam will 
be made of research on policy issues (admission, control, integration and citizenship); 
family-related issues (demography, family migration, gender and age related 
migration); and integration patterns (work, space, identity and second generations). 
The first of these latter topics has a dual objective, presenting simultaneously the main 
research available and the related public policies existing towards immigration. In the 
final section, a brief synthesis is made and some research gaps will be tentatively 
identified. Compared to other states of the art in the field, this one differs in some 
respects, among which focusing more attentively on family and social inequality 




The history of European immigration is not as recent as sometimes portrayed. In 
countries such as France, a considerable amount of inflows existed already in the first 
half of the 20th century. But in all developed Western countries, large inflows occurred 
mainly after the Second World War, in the framework of a solid economic expansion 
that lasted for circa 30 years – the so-called “30 glorious years”. As well documented 
by several sources, most of the immigrants were then supposed to be temporary 
guests, but many remained. From the 1970s onwards several changes occurred, 
including the enactment of restrictive policies, the changing geography of flows and 
new migration patterns. From the 1980s, Southern Europe and Ireland gradually 
became important targets of immigration, together with some Scandinavian countries. 
More recently, after the end of the Cold War, also Central and Eastern European 
countries became object of concern, given the importance of transit and, later, durable 
forms of immigration (Bonifazi et al., 2008; Okolski, forthcoming). During these 
decades, also outflows took place from most European countries – although always 
less researched. Many of these were intra-EU flows. At the same time, a clear policy 
driven difference started to emerge between intra-EU flows and others involving third 
countries. The contradiction between (quasi) free circulation – successively updated 
with the new EU enlargements – and restrictions towards third-country nationals 
became increasingly evident. 
 
The years of solid economic expansion in Europe, lasting until the mid-1970s, were 
largely based on manufacturing industries and a relatively stable international 
environment. During this period, most of the inflows targeted the Northwestern 
4 
 
countries and obtained a durable job. When the national and international context 
changed, new migration patterns emerged. Globalisation brought with it a new kind of 
flows, including more irregular immigration, asylum seekers and refugees, and accrued 
social concerns. This was also the time of the new service and information economy, 
increasing deregulation of the labour market and global economic competition. The 
growing politicization of immigration than then took place, deriving from a new public 
attitude towards inflows, was just a prelude to the more recent securitization debate.  
 
The measure of international migration is complex. As described by several sources – 
including, for example, an extensive work carried out by Poulain and others (2006), 
resulting from an EC funded project –, the methodology and concepts used in this field 
largely differ among European countries. Recently, the EC has launched an initiative to 
carry out a harmonization of migration statistics in the EU, a measure needed since 
long ago 8. However, its outcome is not yet complete. Despite the efforts of 
institutions such as the OECD, in the framework of its annual International Migration 
Outlook, comparative exercises are always fragile. This means that a comparative 
analysis may be mostly be carried out using general definitions and a macro vision. 
When entering the detail of variables and geography, the methodological difficulties 
for comparisons become evident. 
 
Despite the methodological problems, recent statistical data confirm the importance 
and widespread character of immigration in Europe. Data on annual net migration 
rates in OECD countries, from 1955 to 2007, are displayed in Table 1 9, as well as data 
on the contribution of net migration to population growth in 2006, displayed in Figure 
1. The persistence and widespread character of immigration is clear. The observation 
of net migration growth in Europe since the 1950s confirms several facts: the durability 
of inflows to the Northwestern countries until today; the turnaround from emigration 
to immigration in several countries, such as in Southern Europe; and the gradual 
advent of new immigration destinations. Furthermore, comparison between net 
migration and natural increase is telling about the way how immigration is driving 
demographic growth. In a context of overall demographic decline in Europe, with a 
generalized pattern of low fertility, it is mainly migration that is allowing for a positive 
growth and the smoothing of the structural impacts of ageing.   
  
Data about the proportion of foreign-born and foreign population in the OECD 
countries, between 1995 and 2006, are displayed in Table 2 and Figure 2. These two 
criteria – country of birth and country of citizenship – are the most common ones to 
capture the volume of immigration. Although the former is more rigorous, since it 
measures all individuals (nationals and foreigners) that actually migrated between 
countries, the second is the most easily available, since it grasps all foreign individuals 
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(immigrants and non-immigrants, including the so-called second generation) living in a 
country. Both series of data confirm that the European countries, particularly the EU, 
present today a human landscape, in migration terms, not fundamentally different 
from the “traditional immigration countries” of America and Oceania. 
 
Taking, for instance, the foreign-born population, some European countries, such as 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, Ireland and Austria had in 2006 a larger share of immigrants 
than the United States, a country in which immigration is part and parcel of national 
identity. Taking the criteria of foreign population, the same European countries are 
joined by Spain, Belgium and Germany as having a higher share than the United States. 
When observing the rate of growth during recent years (1995 to 2006), it is visible that 
both the share of foreign-born and foreigners are on the rise in most European 
countries. The speed of growth has been higher in some of the recent European hosts, 
such as the Southern European and Ireland, countries in which the number of 
immigrants (or foreigners) sometimes doubled or tripled in just ten years. Spain is the 
most impressive example, having passed from a proportion of 1.6 per cent of 
foreigners in the whole population, in 1997, to a huge 10.3 per cent, in 2006. 
 
The legal channels sought for by prospective immigrants are diverse (Figure 3). In 
2006, family-related migration, including family reunification and marriage migration 
(entries of fiancés or recently married spouses of citizens or legal foreign residents) 
accounted for the majority of inflows, approaching 44 per cent of the total. This was 
followed by individuals entering in the framework of free movement provisions, 
particularly in the case of the EU, labour migration and humanitarian grounds 
(including refugees). The situation was very different from country to country, with 
family migration dominating in countries such as the US and France (OECD, 
International Migration Outlook, 2008). However, these numbers do not reflect 
undocumented immigration and temporary mobility.  
 
Several data about the economic participation of immigrants in OECD countries are 
displayed in Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 4 to 7. The important contribution of 
immigrants in national economies, as well as some of the main reasons for related 
social inequalities, may be observed in those figures. Data confirm the relatively high 
labour participation rates of foreign-born populations, although usually smaller than 
the native’s ones (Figure 4); the fact that it is the less skilled that display highest 
participation rates (Table 3 and Figure 5) – a situation related to their frequent 
deskilling, i.e., the fact that they often perform tasks below their educational level; 
their frequent insertion in some of the less privileged economic sectors, such as 
manufacturing, construction and personal services (Table 4); their higher share in 
flexible and precarious labour arrangements, such as temporary employment (Figure 










3.1. Policies: admission, control, integration and citizenship 
 
Immigration policies are a crucial area to understand immigration in Europe. On the 
one hand, they reflect the steps taken by national governments and supra-national 
institutions, most notably the EU, to deal with inflows and related issues, including 
immigrants’ integration. On the other hand, a large amount of research has been 
devoted to study policy developments. In fact, policy developments and policy 
research go hand in hand, what justifies presenting both in this section. Two main 
aspects of immigration policy will organise this section: first, admission and control, 
and second, integration and citizenship. It must be noted that policy builds realities, in 
the sense that it gives visibility to some issues and omits others. Although it is the 
function of the researcher not to follow closely the policy lines, research efforts have 
been in fact strongly tied to policy dilemmas and related public debates. Despite this, 
the next paragraphs will try to highlight both the research directly tied to policy needs, 
as well as more autonomous research. 
 
3.1.1. Admission policies 
 
(a) General policy issues 
Some of the immigration issues dealt with by policymakers are related to admission 
procedures and control mechanisms. The objective is to know who may be legally 
admitted in a country, and in what conditions, and the ways of preventing unwanted 
immigration. During the period of economic growth between the mid-1940s and mid-
1970s, there were, according to Castles and Miller (2003), three main categories of 
countries: the “classical” immigration countries, such as the North American and 
Australia, in which permanent settlement and family reunion were promoted, and in 
which a legal immigrant was always a prospective citizen; European countries such as 
the UK, France and Netherlands, where immigrants from former colonies were granted 
favourable conditions of entry and easy access to citizenship, and where other 
immigrants were often relatively well accepted; and European countries such as 
Germany, Austria and Switzerland, tied to the classical “guestworker” model. After the 
mid-1970s this distinction became blurred. The European countries converged in many 
respects and, under certain perspectives, are also becoming closer to the classical 
immigration countries. This seems to be a two-way process. As stated by Miller (1999), 
currently a Europeneization of American policy and an Americanization of European 
policy may be witnessed. A similar idea was expressed by authors such as Cornelius et 
al. (2004), when defining their “convergence hypothesis”: immigration policies tended 
to converge to a general restrictive approach in major developed countries. But it is 
usually argued that an important distinction remain: the identity of the European 
nations is not related to immigration, but much more to some ethnic homogeneity, at 
the contrary of North American ones, whose founding myths evolve around 




All countries also create important differences among immigrants. As described in 
several sources, the “categorisation of immigrants” by policymakers, on the basis of 
nationality, ethnicity or skill level, enacts separate groups facing different admission 
constraints (Baganha et al., 2006: 31-32). The classical cleavage had to do with the 
colonial and post-colonial relationship between countries. Very often immigrants 
coming from ex-colonies were granted privileges, both for entry and acquisition of 
nationality. This occurred in the Northwestern European countries already referred to, 
but also in Southern European ones, such as Spain and Portugal. More generally, links 
based in ancestry and ethnic identity have served to produce privileges: although the 
German case was the more well known in the second half of the 20th century, all 
countries possessing diasporas favour this kind of action 10. More recently, in the 
European context, the sharpest difference occurs between EU and third-country 
nationals. As it will be seen ahead, these different groups face completely different 
conditions for admission and, generally, acquisition of rights. 
 
Notwithstanding these selective criteria, since the 1990s the trend among European 
countries – and, particularly EU ones – was towards restrictive policies and a focus on 
control. As stated by Baganha et al. (2006: 26), “the control of migration has 
preoccupied the minds of policymakers ever since the relatively liberal migration 
regime that prevailed during the classical period of post-war labour immigration came 
under increasing pressure in the early 1970s, and much more forcefully, in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. As a result migration policy in general came to be seen as being 
essentially about controlling and preventing unwanted flows”. In fact, after the oil-
shock of the mid 1970s and the profound economic restructuring that took place, 
several changes occurred: the labour demand for low skilled jobs was not as evident as 
before, unemployment increased and immigration pressure became stronger. The 
latter resulted from the end of the Cold War (bringing with it the re-entry of Central 
and Eastern countries in the European migration system), the conflicts that took place 
(particularly the one in ex-Yugoslavia, in 1991-1995) and the large economic gaps 
remaining (and sometimes widening) among developed and less developed countries. 
The changing context explained the changing attitudes of European authorities and 
public opinions regarding immigration. 
 
The new policy initiatives, particularly since the early 1990s, have been several. The old 
and new European immigration countries introduced stricter border controls, new visa 
requirements, penalties for airlines which failed to control the documentation of their 
passengers, public and workplace inspections, and improved means for detecting 
falsified documents. At the same time, the available legal avenues for immigration, 
such as family reunion and asylum seeking, were made more difficult for potential 
migrants, and renewed efforts were launched to combat irregular employment, 
smuggling and trafficking. These initiatives were mainly of a reactive type. As argued 
by Castles and Miller (2003: 118), “this general climate of restrictiveness led some 
observers to speak of a «Fortress Europe», building walls to keep out impoverished 
masses from the South and East”. 
                                                             





In recent years, this restrictive stance coexisted with some mild opening to new 
immigrants. The acceptance of immigrants is based in principles of human rights 
(which were always present), economic and demographic needs. The channels of 
family reunion and asylum seeking always existed, although, as it will be seen ahead 
(see next sub-sections), were changed to allow a more rigorous scrutiny, what in 
practice meant more obstacles to applicants. They result from the acceptance of 
human rights principles and the adhesion to world legal regimes. The economic needs 
are translated in the enactment of temporary labour programmes for low skilled 
workers and specific avenues for highly skilled professionals. The demographic need is 
repeatedly cited as an argument for improved channels of regular inflows. It is 
meaningful that, in 2000, the (then) EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, 
António Vitorino, stated that “the zero immigration policies of the past 25 years are 
not working”, urging for “new legal ways for immigrants to enter the EU” (cit. in 
Martin, Martin and Weil, 2006: 74-75). However, the growing politicization of the 
issue, the public debate and social tensions around immigration, and the security 
concerns, mostly raised after September 11th, justify that pro-active policies are still, at 
the most, timid and tentative 11. 
 
At the same time, a new consensus started to emerge that immigration regulation 
could not be made by individual host countries alone, but required enhanced 
cooperation. This occurred at several levels: the EU framework, in which several steps 
were taken since the 1990s; bilateral cooperation with sending countries; multilateral 
cooperation between countries (the better example of which being the High Level 
Dialogue on International Migration and Development that took place at the United 
Nations in 2006 - see also GCIM, 2005); and cooperation between governments and 
civil society. As written by Baganha et al. (2006: 30-31), “the emergent international 
policy responses seem to encourage the participation of different levels of government 
(national, regional and supra-national), the input of non-governmental and private 
agencies, multilateral rather than bilateral fora and partnership between the countries 
involved in the migration pattern (sending, receiving and transit countries). The fact 
that numerous agencies have come to influence the process of policy-shaping or even 
policy making requires a less state-centric analysis of migration policies and also the 
study of the evolving modes of cooperation. The concept of multilevel governance 
seems to be useful for the development of such new approaches” (see also Zincone 
and Caponio, 2006). 
 
The role of the EU must yet be singularized. Besides the principle of free circulation of 
labour, which was one the early pillars of the Union, immigration have been the object 
of several initiatives since the 1990s. This commitment also explained an increasing 
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research on the theme. In the words of Penninx et al. (2008: 7), “the EU, and 
specifically the European Commission, has commissioned a significant amount of 
research and overview studies since international migration was declared a topic of 
communitarian policymaking (Amsterdam Treaty 1997). The field of integration 
followed in 2003 after the Communication on Immigration, Integration and 
Employment (2003) was politically accepted. EU-policies in the latter field, however, 
were not communitarian, but to be based on consensus of sovereign partners”. Whilst 
some aspects have been the object of agreement and common policy in the EU, such 
as border control, asylum procedures, family reunification, EU citizenship and rights for 
long-term third-country residents, others are still the prerogative of nation-states, 
such as labour admission and, above all, access to nationality (for a synthesis on the 
latest EU approach to immigration and asylum issues, see Collett, 2010). 
 
(b) Labour admission 
The recognition of labour needs, which would be filed up by immigrants, was not made 
without hesitations by European governments. Contrary to the period until the mid-
1970s, economic expansion was no longer made on the basis of a stable environment, 
long-term contracts and a large need of low skilled labour. Moreover, inflows now 
faced a situation of structural unemployment (also affecting natives), flexible labour 
arrangements and overall pressure over social protection mechanisms. For this reason, 
during many years no significant legal avenues for labour immigration were opened up 
in the EU. The main route to the labour market was irregular migration, coupled by the 
possibilities allowed by family reunion and asylum seeking legal channels. 
 
The situation started to change during the 1990s. After the end of the Cold War, a 
number of temporary foreign worker policies were enacted, mainly involving low 
skilled workers targeting sectors such as agriculture. The second generation of 
temporary worker programmes was initially an initiative of countries such as Germany, 
aiming to support the transition period in the economies of Central and Eastern 
countries after the fall of the socialism, as well as a means of combating irregular 
migration in this context (Castles and Miller, 2009). Other countries followed this 
approach, such as the Netherlands and Sweden. Meaningfully, these timid 
programmes were viewed as progressive in the new restrictive climate. This is 
obviously a paradox, since the guestworker programmes prevalent during the 1960s 
and 1970s, which involved much more immigrants, had been widely criticized for their 
limited integration prospects and incapacity to prevent settlement. But following the 
same policy line, some countries of Southern Europe, particularly Italy and Spain, 
launched further temporary work programmes since the 1990s to fill up labour needs. 
In this latter context, most of the programmes involved seasonal workers targeting 
agricultural jobs.   
 
The recognition of skill shortages in highly skilled domains, notably information and 
communication technologies (ICT), later followed as an immigration channel. This 
mainly occurred during the second half of the 1990s, when the ICT bubble was more 
visible, also following initiatives of the United States to admit a higher number of 
specialists in that domain. This led a number of European countries to design specific 
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legal avenues for highly skilled workers, particularly ICT experts (see OECD, 2002). The 
German case is among the best known: the country launched the Green Card in 2000, 
mainly targeting ICT specialists – although its quantitative target would be far to be 
met (Kolb et al., 2004). The recent initiative of the EU of launching a Blue Card is of the 
same kind (Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, coming into force 
in 2011). This means that the more relevant permanent labour shortage explicitly 
admitted by EU governments in recent years is of highly skilled people, the one 
supposed to improve the competitive advantage of Europe in the global arena. Low 
skilled needs are viewed mostly as temporary. 
 
However, researchers have pointed to the fact that plenty durable opportunities in less 
skilled occupations remain. In fact, a large amount of literature define the current 
economic environment in developed economies has providing dual opportunities in 
the labour market, either at the top or at the bottom of the professional ladder (for 
example, Sassen, 1991). The way how countries have been fulfilling less skilled labour 
needs differ. In most cases, recourse is made to irregular immigrants and temporary 
work programmes, besides less privileged citizens (including long-term immigrants and 
their offspring). Two other policy approaches have been developed in recent years. 
One is exemplified by the UK. The recent introduction of a points system in this 
country, which mainly rewards skilled labour migrants, was accompanied by the 
admission than less skilled opportunities would be fulfilled in the framework of the EU 
free circulation of workers. For as long as economic disparities remain in the EU, it is 
feasible that low income countries (such as Poland) are available to send labour to 
higher income ones (such as the UK). A second development was sought for by the 
Southern European countries. In Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece systems of quotas 
were developed since the 1990s, which tried to tackle the various labour market 
opportunities (Arango et al., forthcoming). Although research on Southern Europe 
demonstrated the many failures of such systems, they were nonetheless meaningful as 
a quest for proactive regulation of labour migration.   
 
(c) Family reunification 
One of the long-lasting legal channels for admission in the EU is family-related 
immigration. Taking into account legal permanent immigrants, it represents nowadays 
the majority of inflows in many EU countries (see Figure 3). Among the European 
hosts, the main exception to this rule is the one of Southern European countries. This 
is explained by the recent character of immigration in the latter context, favouring a 
larger share of labour movements (single individuals who only later will bring their 
families in), and by the importance of irregular inflows, even when family members are 
involved.  
 
The possibility of family reunification, as well as the one of asylum seeking (see next 
sub-section), was not concealed in the mid-1970s, when restrictive policies were 
enacted. This is the reason why these two channels were from then on the main legal 
avenues for admission, joining irregular migration to explain the persistence of inflows 
towards Europe during the years. The strong entrenchment of family reunification in 
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human rights principles and international law always made it an undeniable right of 
immigrants 12. The EU laid the ground for a unified policy with the EU’s Resolution on 
the Harmonisation of National Policies on Family Reunification in 1993. Later, in 2003, 
it launched a directive about family reunification (Directive 2003/86/EC), proving its 
key character in European immigration policy 13. 
 
Despite the universal acceptance, the evolution of the principles of family reunification 
was not straightforward. As stated by the literature, EU family migration policies 
“typically observe a very narrow understanding of the family” (Kraler and Kofman, 
2009: 4). Although the 2003 directive sets some guidelines about the eligible family 
members, what constitutes the family differs among member-states. Usually, family 
related admission respects to members of the nuclear family, particularly spouses and 
dependent children less than 21 years old, and, in some cases, registered partners 14. 
In a few other cases, also admission of dependent or elderly parents or other 
dependent relatives is allowed. The more abundant cases respect to immigration of 
spouses, more than that of children. One of the reasons for this is that family 
formation or marriage migration (constituting a new family) is surpassing conventional 
family reunification (reunion of separated families) as the main form of family reunion 
(Kraler and Kofman, 2009).  
 
Compared with traditional immigration countries, such as North-America, an 
important difference of the EU is its limitation of the family unit. The former extend 
family migration beyond dependent relatives, also including adult children, siblings and 
non-dependent parents (Kofman and Meetoo, 2008). As argued by Kofman (2004: 
244), in contrast with the United States, Canada and Australia, “(...) in European states 
the criteria based on family ties have not been a priority in immigration policies and a 
highly restrictive definition of the family, normally limited to spouses and dependent 
children within the nuclear family, has been used as the basis of entry”. 
 
Several restrictions have also been enacted over family reunion, whose amount is 
increasing in recent years (Baganha et al., 2006; Bauböck et al., 2006; Kofman and 
                                                             
12 The right to family reunification is part of two human rights conventions: the 1989 UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (although the latter is still to be ratified by most 




 As in other EU laws, this directive allows a significant measure of discretion in its transposition to the 
national laws. For an updated view of the execution of the directive, see Commission of the European 
Communities, “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification”, Brussels, 8.10.2008, 
COM(2008) 610 final. A research project on family migration policy (FARE - Family Reunification 
Evaluation Project), coordinated by Raffaele Bracalenti, Psychoanalytical Institute for Social Research, 
Rome, was funded by the EC just before the launching of the directive (the project lasted from 1999 to 
2002) (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/044_en.html).  
14 An increasing number of countries is recognizing the changing patterns of familial relationships. Some 
already recognize social units such as same-sex relationships, cohabitation, single parents and adopted 
children, such as the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and the UK (Kofman and Meetoo, 2008).  
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Meetoo, 2008). The possibility for family reunion was always linked to certain 
conditions. These traditionally included income requirements and living arrangements 
(including housing), a form of avoiding pressure over the welfare state. More recently, 
also integration requirements are to be met, such as integration tests and knowledge 
of the local language (measures such as these were enacted in countries such as the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Austria in recent years). Since 2009, also the EC is linking 
family reunion with integration prospects, therefore conditioning that right (Collett, 
2010). Besides, immigrant sponsors are required to fulfil a larger period of legal 
residence before calling their families in. In the case of migration for family formation, 
including transnational marriages, requirements for a minimum age of spouses or a 
probationary period of marriage have also been recently enacted. A polemical – and 
meaningful – requirement has been the attempt made by the French authorities to 
impose a DNA testing on immigrant’s children. 
 
The increasing number of restrictions is part of the general restrictive climate existing 
in the EU, but is also closely tied to particular debates. The perspectives about family 
reunification are changing in the EU, as research has often highlighted. The argument 
that family migration may reinforce the pressure over the welfare state and may bring 
in more (unwanted) low skilled workers has been persistently cited for restricting 
family reunion. More recently a further argument has been added, namely that family 
migration may, at the contrary of what was expected, hamper integration prospects. 
This occurs since it may prolong traditional family norms and gender divisions (for 
example, patriarchal relationships, traditional customs such as arranged and forced 
marriages, and domestic violence), contrary to the principles of equity of European 
societies (Kofman and Meetoo, 2008; Kraler and Kofman, 2009). Furthermore, 
restrictions were enabled in face of the abuse of this channel, including “bogus 
marriages” and “sham marriages” (Kofman and Meetoo, 2008).    
 
It must still be added that the possibility of family reunification depends on the legal 
status of the immigrants and, more generally, on their position in a stratified system 15. 
Among the differences, EU citizens face much better prospects for family admission 
than third country nationals. This means that, as stated earlier, the categorisation of 
immigrants affects profoundly their integration patterns. 
 
In face of these changes, immigration based in family reunification decreased recently 
in the EU. Given this fact, some authors have argued that the EU defence of family 
reunification is far from having fulfilled its explicit aims, since it allowed several 
restrictions under the common policy. As argued by Kraler and Kofman (2009: 5), “(...) 
the European Commission failed to reach its objective for greater harmonisation 
through the family reunification directive. Instead of that, it has initiated a race to the 
bottom. (...) As a result, there is a growing gap between the right to family reunion for 
                                                             
15
 A recent comparative European research project delved on this issue: the project, entitled “Civic 
Stratification, Gender, and Family Migration Policies”, funded by the Austrian Ministry of Sciences, was 
coordinated by Veronika Bilger and Albert Kraler, from the International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development (ICMPD), Austria, and lasted between 2006 and 2008. For further information, see Kraler 
and Kofman, 2009 and http://research.icmpd.org/1291.html. 
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family members of third-country nationals and those of EU nationals. Citizens with 
family members from non-EU countries have fewer rights than citizens who have made 
use of mobility rights or other EU migrants and their family members. This ironic 
situation has given rise to what has been termed «reverse discrimination»”.  
 
 
(d) Asylum seekers and refugees 
Such as in family reunification matters, immigration policies are limited to enact strict 
national prerogatives in asylum and refugee issues. According to Baganha et al. (2006: 
31), “the categorisation of migrants is not only within the mandate of the nation-state. 
Some migrants can claim the right to move and resettle on the basis of interests 
beyond the scope of national policy making, notably the UN's Refugee Convention or 
the European Convention on the Human Rights”. However, the pursuit of universalistic 
obligations was not made without considering realist objectives, linked to national 
dilemmas. Following the same authors, “the outcome of this balancing act has been 
that European governments are willing to accept a limited number of asylum seekers, 
of whom they will recognise an even smaller number of refugees” (id., ibid.).    
 
The importance of the asylum seeker and refugee statuses has fast increased in Europe 
until the early 1990s. As referred to above, this legal channel was one of the few that 
remained available for immigration when the restrictive policies became predominant 
after the mid-1970s. As referred to above, it is also based in human rights principles 
and international law 16. No matter whether the movement was or not duly grounded 
on the Refugee Convention, the number of asylum seekers strongly augmented in the 
EU during the 1980s and reached a peak in the early 1990s. The reasons for this were 
several, including the political and military upheavals of the epoch, particularly related 
to the end of the Cold War, and the overall trend for an increase in worldwide 
migration.  
 
The fact is that, after the early 1990s, several European states reacted and imposed 
restrictions on the admission of asylum seekers. The first steps were taken by Germany 
and Sweden, but a number of other European states followed, increasingly in the 
framework of the EU. The restrictive measures then enacted included: legislative 
changes to restrict access to the refugee status; the setting of temporary protection 
regimes instead of permanent refugee status; measures to prevent individuals without 
adequate documentation from migrating (including requirements for visas and carrier 
sanctions); designation of “safe third countries” bordering the EU (such as Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic), thereby leading to the return of asylum seekers to 
transit countries; restrictive interpretations of the UN’s Refugee Convention; and EU 
cooperation on asylum policy, particularly the Dublin Convention, indicating that the 
first country entered by an asylum seeker might decide on the claim, thereby 
generalising the “safe third country” principle among EU countries (Castles and Miller, 
2003 and 2009; Baganha  et al., 2006). 
 
                                                             
16
 The most important instrument is the UN’s Refugee Convention of 1951. 
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These measures, coupled with other factors, such as the decrease of conflicts and the 
lesser number of individuals showing up to the authorities, explained why the number 
of asylum seekers decreased in Europe – and other developed host countries – since 
the mid-1990s. As stated by Castles and Miller (2003: 107), “the refugee regime of the 
rich countries of the North has been fundamentally transformed over the last 20 years. 
It has shifted from a system designed to welcome Cold War refugees from the East and 
to resettle them as permanent exiles in new homes, to a «non-entrée regime», 
designed to exclude and control asylum seekers from the South”. The result of such a 
policy, resulting from the pressure of controlling inflows, may have had the perverse 
effect of questioning their own legitimacy, since it may erode the guarantee of 
providing international protection (Baganha et al., 2006). 
 
3.1.2. Irregular migration 
 
Irregular migration and related issues, particularly the organized networks fuelling it, 
i.e., smuggling and trafficking networks, have been an important area of concern, both 
for policymakers and researchers, since the 1990s. The volume of irregular migration 
was in direct relationship with the degree of restrictiveness. Since European 
immigration policy became restrictive, after the mid-1970s, and mainly during the era 
of “Fortress Europe”, after the early 1990s, irregular migration became endemic in 
European societies – although in some countries in higher numbers than in others. 
Reasons for this were the continued supply and demand for immigrants, the 
importance of the informal economy (Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004), and the 
informal and organized networks bringing in immigrants. In other terms, new 
(irregular) channels were opened for flows and new actors emerged. A lot of research 
has been devoted to these issues, addressing the policy responses and smuggling and 
trafficking networks. Less research has dealt with the measure of irregular migration 17 
and the lives and strategies of irregular migrants, what is partly explainable by the 
hidden character of this event.   
 
(a) Control and regularizations 
As described above, the measures enacted to improve border control – such as new 
visa requirements, carrier sanctions and techniques for detecting falsified documents –
, used to deter unwanted immigrants, were mainly visible after the 1990s. Despite 
their volume, they were not enough to eradicate irregular inflows, what explained 
further forms of control. These included control within the national territory, namely 
public and workplace inspections, including in the latter sanctions to employers that 
recruited irregular immigrants.  
 
Sanctions to employers existed since the 1970s, both in Europe and North America. 
The rationale behind them was the fact that labour demand in the informal economy 
                                                             
17
 An EC funded research project (6
th
 Framework Programme) was recently carried out on this theme: 
the project, titled “CLANDESTINO - Irregular Migration: Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends 
Across Europe”, was coordinated by Anna Triandafyllidou, from the Hellenic Foundation for European 
and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), and lasted from 2007-2009 (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-
sciences/projects/197_en.html and http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/).   
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was a crucial variable for explaining inflows. It was thus needed a combat to irregular 
labour, at the demand side, to effectively deter it. These sanctions were often 
accompanied by regularisation programmes, a form of “cleaning the field” before 
harsher measures were put in place. This kind of approach, which was started in 
countries such as France and Germany in the 1970s, continued throughout the years, 
although with a drive to the South. In the mid-2000s some Southern European 
countries, such as Spain and Portugal, followed a similar policy (see, for example, 
Arango and Jachimowicz, 2005). However, it must be added that employer sanctions 
have seldom been effective. Reasons for this were insufficient personnel, weak 
coordination between official agencies, inadequate judicial follow up and defensive 
strategies by employers and immigrants (Castles and Miller, 2003). Some lack of 
political will may also have been relevant, given the awareness of the importance of 
cutbacks in labour costs in some sectors.  
 
Regularization programmes were often launched in European countries since the 
1970s. Advantages and disadvantages of such programmes have been diagnosed. The 
first include the need to terminate employment irregularities, to provide immigrants’ 
integration and to better know the facts. The latter include the complaint that 
regularizations are a form of rewarding irregular behaviour and that such operations 
may have a pull effect over new immigrants (Levinson, 2005). Regularization 
programmes were common in several European countries during the 1970s and 1980s, 
but became lesser and more concentrated in space after the 1990s. Initially, they were 
generalized in Western countries and North America. Countries such as France and the 
United States carried such operations still in the 1990s, as well as Switzerland in 2000. 
Until today, advocacy for regularization is frequent in most of the developed host 
countries. But since the 1990s regularization programmes were mostly enacted in 
Southern European countries, namely Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece (id., ibid.). The 
recent increase of immigration in this context, the importance of the informal 
economy, the search for new – and not purely restrictive – ways of managing 
immigration, and a favourable political climate, may explain this Southern peculiarity 
(VV.AA., 2009). It has been object of debate whether the so-called Southern soft 
underbelly is a reality, suggesting a lesser control at the European Southern borders, 
or, at the contrary, control failures are of the same type in Southern and Northwestern 
Europe (Pastore et al., 2006; Finotelli, 2009). 
 
(b) Smuggling and trafficking 
The concept of “migration as a business” (Salt and Stein, 1997) and, more generally, 
the related “migration industry” are today widely used in migration literature. They 
mostly refer to the fact that a set of organized activities support the movement of 
people and that this tends to increase when the restrictiveness is higher. The irregular 
facet of this industry is the one of smuggling and trafficking networks. Since they are 
closely tied to irregular migration – although legal migrants maybe also involved in 





During this period, a vast amount of the research was devoted to the topic. In this 
case, it may be easily admitted that research closely followed policy needs. Many of 
the studies were funded by inter-governmental organisations, such as the IOM, and 
governmental agencies. For the IOM, combat to human trafficking was one of the 
highest priorities in the 1990s, and for the EU countries the theme was always high in 
the agenda. A recent European directive about smuggling and trafficking (Directive 
2004/81/EC on the residence permits issued to third-country nationals who are victims 
of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate 
illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities) confirms the 
priority of the theme in the EU. It must still be noted that research and policymakers 
clearly distinguish – at the theoretical and legal levels – two different aspects of this 
reality: smuggling is defined as the support to irregular migrants, mainly constituting a 
crime against states; whilst trafficking involves fraud and exploitation, mainly 
constituting a crime against people 18.  
 
Research on these themes was abundant after the 1990s. Although the hidden 
character of smuggling and trafficking made the work challenging and incomplete, the 
many recourses devoted to it allowed the production of abundant evidence. Research 
either focussed in destination and transit countries or, in some cases, looked at 
departure areas, all in different geographical locations. Many Northwestern and 
Southern European host countries were researched, and Central and Eastern Europe 
was the object of frequent scrutiny. Furthermore, also departure areas in other 
continents were observed. Some of the evidence provided lead to some recurrent 
conclusions. These include the fact that loose networks often combine with highly 
organized ones, both displaying a very dynamic behaviour in face of policy 
interventions (for example, Pastore et al., 2006); physical risks associated with both 
smuggling and trafficking are high (for example, Carling, 2007); supply and demand 
variables often combine in explaining inflows (for example, Anderson and Davidson, 
2003); and regular and irregular statuses often superpose, as is the case of family 
members and asylum seekers using the services of smugglers, and individuals being 
trafficked as legal immigrants to the sex industry (using visas to work on the 
entertainment industry).  
 
3.1.3. Integration policies and citizenship 
 
(a) General policy issues 
Until recently, integration was not an issue in European immigration policy. The reason 
was that immigrants were conceived as temporary workers and their permanent 
settlement was not officially tackled. However, with the time, it became evident that 
many guest remained and that support policies should be enacted. Until the 1990s, it 
was mostly ad hoc measures that were put in place and a large part of the 
responsibility was delegated to the civil society, particularly NGOs, trade unions and 
churches. The most notable exceptions were Sweden and the Netherlands, which since 
                                                             
18 The United Nations (UN) produced definitions on both issues in two recent protocols – the UN 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and 
the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, both adopted in 2000. 
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the late 1970s put in practice comprehensive policies. Since the 1990s the situation 
changed dramatically and most countries developed integration concerns. At the same 
time it became clear that integration policy should be more than about episodic 
support, and had to be linked to a self-image of the state. As argued by Penninx  et al. 
(2006: 12), “(...) integration policies inevitably go far beyond the simple idea of 
providing facilities for newcomers to adapt and function in the new society. The 
premise of any integration policy ultimately leads to questions of how the society in 
which newcomers «integrate» essentially defines itself and whether it is able and 
willing to change. (…) This has led, using the newcomers as a trigger or a threat, to 
much more fundamental questions and discussions on the identity of our societies: 
who are we?” (Penninx et al., 2006: 11-12). This meant that the focus of integration 
policies has also been directed to issues of social cohesion, plunging deeply on the 
political debate.  
 
In this larger sense, integration policies are closely related with different models of the 
nation-state or, in other words, with different concepts of citizenship. Historically, 
following Castles and Miller (2003: 243), three main cases may be found: “some 
countries of immigration make it very difficult for immigrants to become citizens, 
others grant citizenship but only at the price of cultural assimilation, while a third 
group makes it possible for immigrants to become citizens while maintaining distinct 
cultural identities”. These categories are closely related with laws dealing with the 
access to nationality, which will be examined in a next sub-section, and more generally 
with the granting of civil, political and social rights.  
 
It also must be stressed that citizenship is a dynamic field, in the sense that attitudes 
and policies evolve. This was the case in the EU – and in a multitude of levels. At the 
national level, several countries have been changing their integration models, 
including access to nationality. The overall pattern of these changes was neither clear 
nor straightforward. In some recent cases, this has meant a drive towards a “neo-
assimilationist” model, meaning by this a higher claim for identification of would-be 
immigrants with national norms and language – as reflected in recent policy changes in 
countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands, whilst in other cases the option for a 
multicultural model seems to have prevailed – as was the case of some Southern 
European hosts, such as Portugal. 
 
Regardless of the different integration models, in many cases long-term immigrants 
have acquired, in the EU societies, a status of quasi-citizenship – designated by 
Hammar (1990) as denizenship 19 -, whereby a multitude of rights was acquired, except 
the political ones resulting from nationality. In all cases different types of immigrants 
acquired different citizenship rights. In this respect, at the EU level several changes 
occurred, including the granting of the EU citizenship in 1992 and the concession of 
rights to third country nationals. The latter has included the definition of a status of 
residential or civic citizenship for long-term residents, object of a recent directive 
                                                             
19 According to the Swedish sociologist, “denizenship” is one of the three legal statuses associated to 
immigrants (the other two are alienship and citizenship). It refers to two different immigrant categories: 
i) labour migrants with permanent residence status and their descendants and ii) recognized refugees. 
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(Directive 2003/109/EC, concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long 
term residents), also known as “LTR Directive” (Bauböck et al., 2006) 20. 
 
Finally, it must be noted that the fields of admission and control, on the one hand, and 
integration policy, on the other, are typically separated domains of intervention and 
reflection. At the most, the two domains are linked by the frequent political assertion 
that a restrictive admission is a pre-condition for a successful integration. In recent 
years, the linkage became stronger and the situation was in some cases reversed. As 
said, some EU countries, including Denmark and the Netherlands, require that the 
would-be immigrants attend integration courses or pass a language test. This means 
that, for the first time, admission is conditional on integration (Penninx et al., 2006; 
Baganha et al., 2006).   
 
(b) Integration measures 
Besides the general principles in which integration policies lie, these may be observed 
in detail by considering the different domains of policy intervention. At the national, 
regional and local level, numerous evaluation exercises have been made, either 
commanded by the authorities or resulting from independent research. At a European 
comparative level, similar exercises would be of utmost difficulty, given the different 
institutional contexts of the EU countries and the multiple empirical issues under 
observation. However, many of the obstacles to a comparative analysis have been 
removed with the launching of the Migrant Policy Index (MIPEX) (Niessen et al., 2007) 
21. This project, carried with the support of the Migration Policy Group and the British 
Council, and co-financed by the European Community (INTI Programme: Preparatory 
Actions for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals), involved a large network of 
European researchers and policymakers. Its objective was comparing the immigrants’ 
integration policies of the EU states, plus Switzerland, Norway and Canada, aiming to 
rank them in diverse policy areas and, broadly, on the whole integration policy –
disregarding the above notion of integration models. The ranking was achieved by 
defining a number of policy areas, several policy indicators of each area, and a 
benchmark for each indicator (based on Council of Europe Conventions, EU Directives 
and European-wide policy recommendations). Meaningfully, since it reflects the 
outcome of the categorization process already referred to, the index only refers to 
third country nationals legally residing in each EU country, not counting EU citizens, 
refugees and asylum seekers, and irregular migrants. 
 
Aside from the concrete results of such ranking, what is relevant for the current 
purpose are the policy dimensions considered in MIPEX, since they represent the main 
specific actions that may be taken by the states in the integration realm. The six policy 
areas considered in that project were labour market access (including eligibility, labour 
market integration measures, security of employment and rights associated), family 
reunion (including eligibility, acquisition conditions, security of status and rights 
                                                             




 See also http://www.integrationindex.eu. 
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associated), long-term residence (including eligibility, acquisition conditions, security 
of status and rights associated), political participation (including electoral rights, 
political liberties, consultative bodies and implementation policies), access to 
nationality (including eligibility, acquisition conditions, security of status and dual 
nationality) and anti-discrimination (including fields of application, enforcement and 
equality policies). Issues related with family reunion have been observed in a previous 
sub-section. The issues of political rights and access to nationality, crucial to a full 
citizenship, will be examined in the next sub-section. 
 
(c) Political rights and access to nationality 
Citizenship is a multidimensional concept, which includes a set of civil, social and 
political rights. The latter is considered of vital importance, since they represent the 
capacity of voicing and acting over collective issues, i.e., taking part in the 
management of collective affairs in a political community. The main obstacle to the 
access to these rights is that they are contingent on nationality. As written by Bauböck 
et al. (2006: 87), “(...) in contrast with civil liberties and many social welfare 
entitlements, political participation rights are still significantly attached to the legal 
status of nationality”.  
 
Several changes occurred in this field, in the EU, during recent decades. When the 
guestworker era prevailed, the theme was out of the agenda of policymakers and, 
often, researchers. In the 1990s the situation changed. Political mobilization, 
participation and representation of immigrant groups were often accepted, especially 
at the local level. As a result, important novelties showed up, which gradually 
decoupled political rights from nationality. The EU citizenship and the concession of 
local voting rights to immigrants, disregarding nationality, was a remarkable step in 
giving voice to non-national communities. As said above, the European Commission 
has also introduced the concept of civic citizenship in 2000, meaning by this the 
granting of several rights and duties to long-term immigrants, including political rights 
at the local level, as a necessary step for successful integration. In other cases, 
consultative bodies (local, regional and national) were enacted to represent 
immigrants. Finally, the discussion has also started, among researchers and 
policymakers, whether the access to full political rights (including vote in national 
elections) should depend on nationality or should constitute simply an extension of 
voting rights (Bauböck et al., 2006) 22. 
 
Nowadays, access to nationality is still the key variable to obtain full voting rights – a 
matter that is linked, at the same time, to collective identity issues. For this reason its 
position in the integration debate is of utmost importance. The concession of 
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 An EC funded research project was recently carried out on the theme of immigrants’ political 
integration at the local level: the project, titled “LOCALMULTIDEM - Multicultural Democracy and 
Immigrants' Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the 
Local Level”, was coordinated by Laura Morales, from Universidad de Murcia, and lasted between 2006-




nationality to a foreigner means not only his/her access to collective power, but also 
his/her acceptance in the polity as “one of us”.  
 
A large amount of research has been carried out on the evolution of nationality rules 
throughout Europe. The most comprehensive of such studies was coordinated by 
Rainer Bauböck, in the framework of a project funded by 6th EU Framework 
programme. The project, known as NATAC (The Acquisition and Loss of Nationality in 
EU Member States), compared nationality laws and their implementation in the 15 old 
member states, being followed by an extension to the 10 new member states and 
some other European countries 23. The project intended to know the evolution of 
contemporary conceptions of statehood, nation-building and citizenship in the EU, as 
well as testing an eventual convergence hypothesis. Data collected in its framework 
showed that “(…) there is still a remarkable diversity between European nationality 
laws concerning conditions for acquisition of citizenship by birth as well as by 
naturalisation. (...) This is, on the one hand, due to a lack of EU competency for 
harmonisation or setting of minimum standards. On the other hand, policy imitation 
across countries seems to be also less developed than in other areas of integration 
policy” (Bauböck et al., 2006: 74-75). However, some elements suggest that a majority 
of countries tended to more liberal policies in the 1990s and more restrictive in the 
new century. 
 
Although nationality laws remain a strict prerogative of individual member-states, it is 
meaningful that the European Commission has introduced some common principles in 
this area. In 2003, a communication from the European Commission on immigration, 
integration and employment (COM (2003) 336 final) suggested some standards for 
members-states’ nationality laws, indicating that “«naturalization should be rapid, 
secure and non-discretionary» and that for second and third generation immigrants 
«nationality laws should provide automatic or semi-automatic access» to citizenship” 
(Bauböck et al., 2006: 84). Until the moment, however, many differences remain, both 
at the level of the underlying principles of nationality acquisition – particularly the 
weighting of ius soli and ius sanguini, together with the ius domicili – and at the level of 
practical operationalization of the law. 
 
Meanwhile, at the same time as the debate around the change in citizenship models 
and nationality laws occurred, a decisive modification took place. With the spread of 
migration, the easiness of travel and communication and the growing number of 
mixed marriages, there has been a trend towards the acceptance of dual citizenship. 
Given the gradual recognition that an individual may have more than one loyalty, an 
increasing number of EU nation-states has been accepting this principle. In practice, 
this means that the traditional basis of national political communities is being eroded, 
in favour of a growing transnationalism (Faist et al., 2008). 
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 For more information on the project, see http://www.imiscoe.org/natac/. The results of the NATAC 
project have been published in 2006, in two volumes (Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch, 
2006). A third volume about the ten new member states and Turkey has been published in 2007 
(Bauböck, Perchinig and Sievers, 2007). Finally, an updated edition was published in 2009 (Bauböck, 




3.2. Families: demography, family migration, gender and age 
 
A large body of research has addressed immigration from a family-related perspective. 
Under this heading, several areas may be referred to. In this section, some of the main 
recent studies about the demographic impact of immigration, family migration, gender 
issues and age related migration will be reviewed. 
 
3.2.1. Demographic impact 
 
The demographic impact of immigration in Europe has been the object of an increasing 
amount of research. The reason for this is plain: in face of the potential decline and 
structural ageing of the European population, the direct and indirect impacts of 
immigration have been much welcome. The advent of the second demographic 
transition, with the persistence of low (and lowest-low) fertility levels and increased 
life expectancy, has led all European societies to a more or less advanced stage of low 
natural increase and ageing. The inputs resulting from (usually) young adult 
immigrants and their offspring allowed total population increase, slowed down the 
pace of ageing and smoothed some of its consequences.  
 
Studies such as the one of Haug et al. (2002), carried out in the framework of the 
Council of Europe, have been among the first to delve comparatively on those issues. 
Despite the frailty of information sources, its conclusions pointed to the fact that 
immigration have contributed significantly to the positive demographic growth and the 
lesser pace of ageing in a number of European countries, mainly since the 1960s. This 
had to do with both its sheer numbers (direct impact) and its delayed demographic 
effect, given the volume of immigrants’ offspring (indirect impact). Fertility rates 
among immigrants, although varied, tended frequently to reach the host country 
levels. However, their concentration on adult fertile ages led in every case to a high 
proportion of births issued from immigration – the actual basis of the second 
generation. Alternatively, their mortality rates were low, again given the effect of the 
young age structure.  
 
After the UN’s (2000) seminal contribution, the impossibility of replacement migration, 
in the sense of offsetting the consequences of European low fertility, has been 
repeatedly stated. Several studies, such as Lutz and Scherbov (2006) and Bijak et al. 
(2007), confirmed that immigration may be, at the most, a small part of the solution to 
an unavoidable problem, i.e., low demographic growth and ageing. However, 
simulations of net migration rates over the next decades suggested that a significant 
immigration would be beneficial to sustain the current quantitative level of the 
workforce and the current potential support ratios in most EU countries. 
 
Further research delved on the impacts of immigration on fertility, family patterns (see 
next sub-section), morbidity and mortality. With regard to fertility, some recent 
studies suggest that immigrants’ fertility, although varied and even when declining 
towards the host country levels, have added significantly to national demographic 
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patterns. On the one hand, children born from immigration account for a growing 
share of total live births in many EU countries 24. On the other hand, they have had an 
impact on the stabilisation or even increase of fertility in some countries, as in some 
lowest-low fertility cases, such as Spain and Italy (Billari, 2008). With regard to 
morbidity and mortality, and despite the relatively weak incidence of these events in 
immigrant populations, given its relatively recent character and young age structure, 
several studies observed the links between migration and health, taking into account 
health related problems of immigrant communities and impacts on public health 
(McKay et al., 2003). 
 
The importance of immigration – including national, intra-EU and third-country 
national immigrants – for the present and future of European populations is universally 
accepted. Indeed, it must be reminded that inflows and outflows are part of 
demography, at the same title as births and deaths. It is only the political and cultural 
challenges associated with foreign inflows that have given so much visibility to this 
issue, particularly when non-EU citizens are concerned. The most extreme evaluation 
of immigration’s impacts is of a British demographer, who is known for his critique 
stance towards inflows: although Coleman’s (2006) proposal of a “third demographic 
transition” seems exaggerated, it is useful as a signal of its current importance.    
 
3.2.2. Family migration 
 
(a) Family migration as a field of study 
Family migration is an area of recent research. During the traditional period of 
guestworker migration, neither immigration was supposed to conduce to settlement, 
nor immigrant families were a challenging issue. Family reunification that took place at 
the time usually followed the male breadwinner model, thus pointing to a monotone 
type of immigrant family. In fact, family migration was neglected until recently, both 
by academics and policymakers. As argued by Kofman and Meetoo (2008: 151-152), 
this may have resulted from their “conceptualization as a feminized and dependent 
form of movement with little relevance for labour force participation”. This neglect is, 
of course, partly linked to the relatively minor role attributed to women’s agency, a 
situation that only changed recently. In fact, family migration presents an important 
linkage with studies on gender and migration (see next sub-section). 
 
During the recent decades, and particularly from the 1990s, the increasing diversity of 
families and migration patterns led to a growing interest on the theme. On the one 
hand, family patterns changed substantially in Europe, sometimes leading to migration 
events. On the other hand, migration itself changed, bringing with it implications on 
family. As synthesized by King et al. (2004: 5-6), “the meaning and nature of the 
concepts of family and household are challenged both by broad social changes in 
Europe, and by the increasing diversity of types of migration and mobility, as earlier 
labour migrations are overlain by migrants who are refugees and asylum-seekers, 
                                                             
24 For example, in Portugal, the number of live-births from a foreign mother or father amounted to circa 
12 per cent of the total in 2008, a value that almost tripled the total percentage of foreigners. 
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clandestine entrants, skilled professionals, students, retirement migrants and many 
others”. 
 
Interest on family networks and strategies, both at sending and host countries’ level, 
was part of the widening research. The increasing diversity of gender roles, migration 
strategies and integration outcomes, including independent female migration, led to 
many studies on the theme. Another topic meriting particular attention was the one of 
transnational families, defined as those “(...) that live some or most of the time 
separated from each other, yet hold together and create something that can be seen 
as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely «familyhood», even across national 
borders” (Kofman and Meetoo, 2008: 154). However, much is still to be done. 
According to Kofman and Meetoo (2008: 151-152), “it is necessary (...) to move 
beyond the narrow economic approaches adopted in previous work on family 
migration (...) and to examine the changing forms and (re)composition of the family, 
the diverse strategies deployed in the course of migration, the gendered composition 
of family migration, the position of specific members of the family, such as children 
and the elderly, and the implications of policy measures for men and women (...). 
Furthermore, as women migrating as heads of household now make up almost half of 
global flows, they are themselves becoming major initiators of family reunification”.   
 
(b) Types of family migration 
Family migration is a heterogeneous field of study. This was not always understood as 
such. As pointed out by King et al. (2006: 252), “European case-studies of international 
family migration have tended to assume traditional paradigms of family organisation – 
the nuclear family above all – and have not fully explored or even acknowledged the 
variety of family and household types which derive from diverse home-country 
settings, or are evolving amongst European populations, or are developing within 
specific transnational migration contexts. Several different family-migration 
trajectories can be identified”. In this respect, researchers and policymakers coincided 
for many years on the orientation towards the nuclear family, given the narrow 
concept of family also prevailing at the policy level. 
 
Since the 1990s, it is widely admitted that there are different forms of family migration 
– and, relatedly, immigrant families. However, the elaboration of a typology is not an 
easy task, given the “fluid and interacting categories” in the field (Kofman, 2004: 246). 
The changing migration patterns contribute to this difficulty, as well as the 
shortcomings of statistical databases. Despite these problems, some general 
classifications may be used. One was suggested by Kofman (2004), for whom there are 
three basic types of family migration:  i) family reunification; ii) family formation or 
marriage migration; and iii) whole family migration. The other was indicated by King et 
al. (2006), who adds to the former typology a separation between family formation 
and marriage migration, as well as a new category, split-family formation. In the next 
paragraphs Kofman’s classification will be used. 
 
The first type of family migration is family reunification, the conventional form of this 
movement. It occurs when an immigrant, living in an host country for a certain period 
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of time and with an already existing family back home, brings in his/her family 
members. Given the legal restrictions in the EU, the usual modality of family 
reunification is the admission of spouses and children, and sometimes also registered 
partners and dependent parents. Although the typical form of reunification 
encompasses a male immigrant and his family, there are more and more cases of 
processes led by immigrant women. 
 
The second type of family migration is family formation or marriage migration. This 
includes two main sub-groups. In the words of Kofman and Meetoo (2008: 155-156), 
“the first consists of second and subsequent generations of children of migrant origin 
(both citizens and non-citizens) who bring in a fiancé(e)/spouse from their parents’ 
homeland or diasporic space. This group has increased due to the growth of second 
and subsequent generations who continue to marry external partners, a particular 
characteristic of Turkish and North African immigrant populations (...). The second 
variant of marriage migration involves permanent residents or citizens bringing in a 
partner they have met while abroad for work, study or holiday. In this case, the 
marriage is a secondary effect of the reason for going abroad”. Other designations for 
these sub-groups are endogenous marriage, or transnational marriage, in the first 
case, since it respects to unions of members of the same ethnic group in different 
countries; and mixed marriage, or binational marriage, in the second case, since it 
involves members of different ethnic groups (Kraler and Kofman, 2009).  
 
Taking both categories, studies have shown that the volume of family formation 
surpassed family reunification in recent years. This was particularly true in countries 
with large settled immigrant communities (Kraler and Kofman, 2009). Particularly, the 
number of mixed marriages, or binational marriages, has been rising widely. In fact, a 
broad notion of mixed marriages includes events as varied as spouses brought in from 
a foreign country, belonging to a different ethnic group from the sponsor; unions of 
residents in the host country, belonging to different ethnic groups; and (in what may 
be seen as constituting a statistical bias) unions between citizens (such as naturalized 
immigrants) and foreigners, although both from the same ethnic group. In any case, 
mixed marriages account today for a significant share of all marriages taking place in 
the EU countries, what justifies being an increasing subject of research in Europe 
(Barbara, 1993). 
 
A particular case meriting attention is the one of arranged marriages, which, in the 
expression of Kofman and Meetoo (2008: 161), “(...) stands out as one of the forms of 
marriage migration that needs to be scrutinized, contained and managed”. Although 
traditional arranged marriages respect to established families, being the marriage 
usually arranged by parents, other fast-growing modalities are modern matchmaking 
services and mail-order brides. In the latter cases, a more or less organized 
intermediation takes place between the partners. The most usual pattern in these 
relationships involves males from developed countries and women from less 
developed countries. There is typically a short period for courtship and, in a growing 





Despite the predominance of male partners in the start of family formation processes, 
recent research has highlighted the growing role of women’s agency (Kofman, 2004). 
There is an increasing number of female immigrants bringing in male spouses and 
fiancés from the origin countries, what is related to a more equal gender balance in 
the second generation and normative changes in sending countries. This is the case, 
for example, with immigrants from Turkey and North African countries. At the same 
time, more and more marriages resulting from international contacts result from 
women’s travelling, studying and working abroad.    
 
The third type of family migration is whole family migration. In this case, the entire 
family – usually a nuclear family – moves at the same time. Given the legal restrictions, 
this case is not common in Europe. The major exception respects to some highly skilled 
immigrants, including intra-EU ones, and refugees. In the first case, some EU countries 
accept that the family of students, work-permit holders and trainers moves along with 
the immigrant 25. 
 
(c) Immigrant families 
One of the areas where research is still scarce is immigrant families. As pointed out by 
Wall (2007: 2252), “the sociology of immigrant families represents a significant lacuna 
in the research on international migration”. According to the same author, the 
available research on the theme has addressed four main topics: the migration 
decision (insofar as migration is often an ongoing family project, negotiated at the 
family level and structured around the needs and resources of the households 26); the 
forms of family migration (including migration led by male or female partners and 
whole family migration); the demographic trends (mainly focussing on immigrants’ 
fertility); and the assimilation of immigration families (studying the different modes of 
integration of family members, including the second generation) (id., ibid.: 2253-4). 
 
Other perspectives are recently emerging on the topic, mainly respecting to family 
dynamics. One is the study of reconciliation of work and family in the framework of 
immigrant families. This was the case of a project funded by the EU entitled “SOCCARE 
– Families, Work and Social Care in Europe” 27. The project, which compared five EU 
countries (Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK) has looked into the way how 
immigrant women with small children balanced work and family care. Among its 
conclusions, it was shown that the nearly absence of family networks increased the 
difficulties faced by women, often also subject to a heavy workload and disposing of 
low incomes, what excluded them to the access to childcare services. The strategies 
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 A recent research project funded by the European Commission delved on this topic: the project, 
coordinated by Norbert Schneider, from the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, Federal Institute 
for Population Research, Germany, was entitled “Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe”; its object 
was the spatial mobility of highly skilled workers inside the EU and its consequences in their family lives 
(see http://www.jobmob-and-famlives.eu). 
26 This approach is used by one of the most relevant theories on migration, the new economics of 
migration. 
27 The project, that lasted from 2000-2003, was coordinated by Sipilae Jorma, from the University of 
Tampere, Finland (see http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/102_en.html). 
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enacted by immigrant families to overcome these problems are described in Wall and 
São José (2004). 
 
Other areas meriting increased attention are mixed marriages and transnational 
families. In the first case, differences in culture, religion and attitude towards family 
and gender roles poses specific challenges to family life (see, among others, Barbara, 
1993). In the second case, attention is given to the possibility of carrying family life 
(including care arrangements and economic support) at the transnational space (see, 
among others, Zontini, 2004). Some of the reasons explaining the growth of the latter 
are the difficulties facing family reunification, the irregular character of immigration 
and work, the live-in arrangements facing domestic workers (particularly in the 
Southern European context), the rotational character of many flows and, of course, the 
easiness of transport and communication. However, it may be argued that studies on 
transnational families mostly consider a nuclear dimension of the family. When taking 
an enlarged notion of the family, the notion is almost as old as international migration 




(a) Gender and migration as a field of study 
Although some research remains “gender-blind”, there is a consensus nowadays about 
the relevance of gender as a key analytical category on migration studies. The 
relevance of gender in migration research can be perceived in two different ways. On 
the one hand, it is important to a full understanding of the immigrants’ experiences 
and strategies; on the other, it is crucial to a better knowledge of the outcomes of 
immigration and integration patterns. Those who reject this idea are neglecting the 
fact, stated by Anthias, that “gender is a relational social category implicated in a range 
of social relations linked to the process of migration” (cit. in King et al., 2004: 33). 
 
It is known that gender studies are not only about women. However, the fact is that it 
has been through them that gender emerged as a key analytical category on the 
migration field. Mostly inspired by the feminist movement, what may be termed as the 
“first wave” of research on immigrant women and gendered migration emerged in the 
early 1980s (e.g. Phizacklea, 1983; Morokvasic, 1984; Simon and Brettell, 1986). These 
studies have challenged migration research with their innovative perspectives about 
the role of immigrant women. Following King et al. (2004), their major findings were 
that i) women migrated in larger numbers than previous male-centred studies 
suggested; ii) women were not merely “followers” of men, being also primary labour 
migrants; iii) even when migrating as dependents, women often entered the labour 
market (with different employment opportunities compared to men); iv) women’s 
migration patterns and integration outcomes varied according to their national and 
ethnic background; and, finally, v) migrant women and their families were treated very 
differently compared to native populations. Furthermore, some of these studies 
addressed related topics, such as the relationship between production and 
reproduction in women’s lives, and whether women’s migration and labour experience 




Since the late 1990s, a “second wave” of literature on immigrant women and gendered 
migration emerged. Still following King et al. (2004), four main perspectives stand out: 
i) migrant women agency, ii) feminisation of international migration, iii) globalisation 
and iv) transnationalism. In the first case, the role of women is now seen as both 
affected by structures (as was stressed before) and enabled by them (in the sense of 
framing their agency), allowing a more flexible analysis of immigration and gender 
relations. In the second case, women are seen has having a more important role in 
migration processes, both quantitatively and as social actors, meaning by this the 
spread of independent strategies. As pointed out by the authors (id., ibid.: 36), “the 
real point about the feminisation thesis is not to do with quantifying female versus 
male migration, but recognising the increased agency and independence of women in 
migration flows and systems”. In the third case, globalisation is seen as both 
constraining women’s migration paths (for example, originating the feminisation of 
poverty, leading to the growth of the international market for domestic workers and 
the sex industry) and providing opportunities for them. In the fourth case, the 
increased presence and active role of immigrant women in transnational networks 
(such as family and care networks, including transnational mothering) is stressed, 
although her position in the hierarchies of power must be still object of discussion. 
 
(b) Migration, patriarchy and women 
One of the most relevant points raised by the literature had to do with the impact of 
international migration over women’s roles and power, i.e., gender relations. Two 
contrasting views are usually expressed. As expressed by King et al. (2004: 39), “some 
lay emphasis on migration as a potentially liberating and transformatory experience, 
through which women are able to regain a measure of control over their lives and 
destinies – often, however, whilst remaining entrenched in the «service» of their 
families who may depend on them for their livelihood. Other analyses are more 
negative: gender is seen as another layer of the multiple oppression of migrant women 
– structurally discriminated against as migrants, as women (both by the host society 
and within their own ethnic group), as members of the labouring underclass, as racially 
stigmatised, and, finally, as accepting these oppressive structures”. 
 
The increased agency and crucial role assured by women in the contemporary world is 
cited. For example, authors such as Sassen talk about the “feminization of survival”: 
“because it is mainly women who make a living, create profit and secure government 
revenue (...) in using the notion of feminization of survival I am not only referring to 
the fact that households and whole communities are increasingly dependent on 
women for their survival (...) governments are also dependent on women's earnings” 
(cit. in Wall, Nunes and Matias, 2008: 604). In other cases, it is her oppression and 
victimisation in current migration that is admitted. It may be argued that, in the 
migration context and, particularly, when observing the European experience, 
generalized assertions about changes in gender relations are not adequate. Recent 
findings suggest that patterns of patriarchal and social control may be changing for 




Hence, some studies suggest that immigration has beneficial effects on women and 
gender relations. In several occasions, immigration and wage earning in Europe may 
lead to increasing independence of women, more flexible division of labour at home, 
less segregation in public spaces and increasing centrality in transnational families and 
networks. This helps to explain why, in some cases, women are more reluctant than 
men about return migration 
 
Contrasting studies describe that many women still suffer of some specific 
circumstances of their immigrant community’s experience (for example, social 
exclusion and enclavement), which tend to collide with values of the destination 
country – usually more favourable to women’s increased autonomy and freedom. At 
this level, many findings indicate that there is a connection between violence and 
migration, namely male violent behaviour against women (spouses, sisters and 
daughters). Some of these studies explore the links between violent male behaviour 
and social conditions, such as racism experience or unemployment and social 
relegation, while others explore the connection between violence and different forms 
of social control within the migrant community (for example, violence against young 
girls from the second generation). Since some immigrant women create their own 
activist groups, this means that there is sometimes an awareness of women's rights 
within the community.  
 
Furthermore, domestic violence is a problem that goes beyond households and 
immigrant communities. The channels of “sex, marriage and maids”, as expressed by 
Phizacklea (1998), define some of the main avenues of female migration to Europe. 
They are also a clear example of the violence perpetrated against them. The sex 
industry is largely demand driven, providing occasion for trafficking networks and 
prostitution, bringing in young women from less developed countries. Marriage, 
particularly arranged marriages and matchmaking, often links men from European host 
countries and women from less developed ones – as in the case of mail-order brides. 
Domestic work and caring, both in live-in and external work arrangements, provide 
numerous job opportunities for immigrant women, particularly in Southern European 
countries, where gender relations are more asymmetric (household tasks are less 
balanced between men and women) and caring is attributed to families. Many of these 
domestic and caring jobs are viewed as awkward and exploitative (King et al., 2004). 
 
In sum, assertions about female migration strategies, independence and power in 
migration processes and at the households, and overall change in gender relations as 
an outcome of migration, must be viewed as more the subject of empirical research 
than that of generalized assumptions. Supporting this approach, a large array of 
research have addressed the theme of female migration in Europe in recent years, 
including various comparative projects funded by the EU 28.  
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 This was the case of projects such as Female Migration Vision, coordinated by Rossana Trifiletti, 
University of Florence, Italy, 2005-2006 (see 
http://www.fondazionebrodolini.it/Kernel/Common/DocumentPage.aspx?docId=6401); GRINE – 
Migrant Women Face Increased Prejudice, coordinated by Luisa Passerini, European University Institute, 




3.2.4. Age related migration 
 
Migration is closely related with age and the life course. This is known since some of 
the pioneering works in the field. Studies about human capital and migration, for 
example, pointed to the fact that most economic migration occurs at young adult ages, 
given the larger period of return (as migration is an economic investment in human 
capital, it would not be rational to migrate in mature adult years). Studies about 
residential mobility suggested that changes in the life cycle – or, more generally, in the 
life course – are related to geographical movements. This time-based perspective has 
been reminded by King et al. (2004 and 2006). When applied to family migration 
events, it is suggested that “taking a time-based perspective, families can be created, 
split and then reunified through different stages of the migration cycle. The life-history 
approach sees a complex interweaving of family stages with migration events: family 
formation or dissolution may set the scene for or trigger migration; and migration in 
turn may provide opportunities for, or in other cases constrain, particular family 
formations. Personal and intra-family relationships and dynamics can also play a 
significant role – such as separation, divorce, or a woman migrating to flee an abusive 
husband” (King et al., 2004: 43-44). When applied to other movements over the life 
course, this time-based perspective may also help to explain movements such as 
migration of children, student migration and retirement migration (King et al., 2006).  
 
Studies on migrant children may be divided according to the framing of the movement, 
addressing the cases of refugees and asylum seekers, victims of trafficking (particularly 
trafficking for sexual exploitation), migrant children with EU citizenship, migrant 
children of third country nationals and inter-country adoptees. Studies on student 
migration are very recent and fast-growing. They stress the recent growth of these 
flows, reinforced by the incentives to mobility (such as the Erasmus and Socrates 
programs at the EU level), their framing on the globalisation of higher education and 
their linkages to youth culture. Studies on retirement migration are also spreading. 
They address its multiple facets, which include, among others, retirement migration of 
wealthy Northwestern Europeans to Southern Europe and retirement migration of 
former economic migrants to their countries of origin (often intra-EU migration). Still in 
the case of retirement migration, recent research highlighted the changing patterns of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
FEMAGE - Needs for Female Immigrants and their Integration in Ageing Societies, coordinated by 
Charlotte Hoehn, Bundesinstitut fuer Bevolkerungsforschung, Wiesbaden, Germany, 2006-2008   (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/195_en.html); FEMIPOL - Integration of Female 
Immigrants in Labour Market and Society. Policy Assessment and Policy Recommendations, coordinated 
by Maria Kontos, Institute of Social Research at J.W. Goethe University , Germany, 2006-2008 (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/projects/196_en.html); GEMIC – Gender, Migration and 
Intercultural Interactions in the Mediterranean and South East Europe: an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 
coordinated by Maria Stratigaki, Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences, Athens, Greece, 
started in 2008 (see http://www.gemic.eu); and GEMMA – Enhancing Evidence Based Policy-making in 
Gender and Migration, coordinated by Diassina Di Maggio, Agenzia per la Promozione della Ricerca 
Europea, Rome, Italy, started in 2008 (see http://www.gemmaproject.eu). The latter site also provides 
information about other research projects related with gender and migration, including some of those  
quoted above (see http://www.gemmaproject.eu/projects_static.aspx). 
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residence and mobility: in the international space, as before in the national one, dual 
residence and seasonal mobility are increasingly common, therefore rendering 
complex the study of migration. Given the legal framework, this is much more relevant 
in the EU than in other international contexts. 
 
All these processes are related to age and, of course, socially constructed, in the sense 
that they are dependent on broader definitions of the individuals’ positions over the 
life course. But they are also related to other social variables. Some of them are 
gendered. For example, retirement migration may be seen – such as domestic work 
and caring – as a gendered process. As reminded by Kofman (2004: 253), “a small-scale 
study of Portuguese in France and of those who had returned to Portugal 29 highlighted 
the enormous disparity between men who entertained return projects, which in many 
cases forced their wives to return as well, and women who preferred to remain with 
their family in France”. Other processes are dependent on social status. Both student 
migration and retirement migration are clearly connected to the individuals’ social 
position and his/her ability to afford such strategies. Finally, many depend on 
immigration policies: the free circulation of EU citizens enables them to much easier 
mobility than occurs with third-country nationals.   
 
3.3. Integration: work, space, identity and second generations 
 
The notion of immigrants’ integration may be explored in two different ways. The first 
is linked with policies and national models of citizenship, as was seen in a former 
section. The second results from the integration patterns in several domains, such as 
labour market, spatial distribution and social relations. These patterns are often 
structural in character, in the sense that they impose significant constraints over 
immigrants’ access to resources and life chances, even when accounting for policy 
initiatives and immigrants’ agency. In other words, they help to explain how 
immigrants are positioned towards social inequality factors. In general, it is known that 
some of the variables conditioning individuals’ lives are closely linked with their 
objective position in the labour market, as occurs with social class, whilst others have 
to do with subjective factors and cultural differences, such as ethnic belonging. In the 
field of immigration, several factors impact on immigrants’ life chances, including work 
and ethnic patterns, but also some others. This section will briefly present some of the 
available research regarding immigrants’ integration patterns in the EU, taking in mind 
the role that they display in affecting social inequality.  
 
3.3.1. Labour market 
 
The study of immigrants’ position in the labour market has been often carried out. 
After the seminal studies of Michael Piore (1979) and Alejandro Portes (1981, among 
others), the patterns of immigrants’ incorporation in the labour market of developed 
host countries are well known. A large part of the explanation is presented by the 
segmented, or dual, labour market theory: the largest proportion of immigrants is 
                                                             
29 Pinto Coelho, D. (1997), “Un ailleurs au quotidien”, in B. Varine (ed.), Les Familles Portugaises et la 
Société Française, Paris, Editions W. 
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driven by the job opportunities offered in the secondary labour market, i.e., the worse 
paid and less interesting jobs, dismissed by native workers on economic and social 
grounds. This means that immigrants are over-exposed to the so-called 3-D jobs (dirty, 
demanding and dangerous). If this was true during the period of large economic 
expansion that lasted until the 1970s, it resumed in a different context in the late 20th 
century, when deregulation and globalisation became dominant. The spread of flexible 
and precarious forms of employment – including temporary jobs, non-voluntary part-
time, atypical time-schedules (such as night shifts), etc. –, as well as labour 
arrangements in the informal economy, have largely affected the immigrant 
workforce. 
 
Despite significant national variations, it is understandable that immigrants are 
displayed in labour statistics with recurrent features: compared to the native 
workforce, they are usually concentrated in some economic sectors (manufacturing, 
construction and personal services, including cleaning and caring); are over-
represented in temporary jobs; are over-exposed to unemployment; are usually under-
paid; and suffer from frequent deskilling (they often work in jobs under their 
qualifications). National variations regard variables such as employment rates, levels of 
social protection and engagement in the informal economy. In this respect, several 
differences distinguish North-western from Southern EU host countries (see, for 
example, OECD, 2007 and 2008; Arango et al., forthcoming). 
 
Despite their predominance in the secondary labour market, many studies have also 
delved into other modes of incorporation. The insertion of immigrants in the primary 
labour market, including the brain drain and highly skilled mobility, has been the 
object of frequent research. Many of this respect to intra-EU movements (see, for 
example, OECD, 2002 and Salt, 2004). A more recent line of research has explored 
immigrants’ entrepreneurship and the related ethnic economy (see, for example, 
Oliveira and Rath, 2008 and Zhou, 2008). It has addressed several forms of immigrants’ 
initiatives, often in the framework of urban economies, benefiting from their ethnic 
social networks and transnational ties. Comparatively less research has addressed the 
theme of professional and social mobility among immigrants. 
 
3.3.2. Spatial segregation 
 
The majority of recent immigration to the EU is directed to large cities. This results 
from the role performed by these cities in the global economy (Sassen, 1991), the 
available job opportunities and the role of social networks. The urban context 
constitutes a magnet over international flows and is also modified by it. As expressed 
by Fonseca (2008: 6), “(...) the increase in international migration is, simultaneously, 
part and parcel of the process of globalization and major cities reinforce their position 
as structural points of the world economic system. At the same time, with regard to 
the social structure of cities, the most noticeable changes are related with increased 
income inequality between the social groups at the top and those at the bottom, as 
well as with the emergence of new types of poverty and social exclusion associated 
with unemployment, ageing and ethnic origin. These transformations lead to conflicts 
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that have to be managed at the urban level and within the metropolitan territory. 
Therefore, urban politics are changing quickly, trying to find new responses to 
maintain the difficult balance between economic competitiveness and social 
cohesion”. 
 
At the urban level, the spatial distribution of immigrants is both an outcome and a 
cause of their broader social differentiation. Residential segregation occurs when there 
is deviation from a uniform spatial distribution. The degree of segregation of 
immigrants is higher insofar as an increase in this deviation occurs. As recalled by 
Asselin et al. (2006: 143), based on the work of Boal, four types of “migrant spatialised 
communities” exist: areas of assimilation-pluralism (where the natives are a large part 
of the local population, but not the majority); mixed minorities areas (where two or 
more ethnic groups coexist); polarised areas (where one ethnic group forms a 
majority); and ghettos (where there is a high degree of concentration of one ethnic 
group). The most extreme form of segregation is the one of ghettos – but here also the 
element of coercion must be added. According to the same authors, “the urban ghetto 
constitutes an extreme form of spatial segregation. (...) [However], [not] every area 
inhabited by an ethnically, racially or religiously defined group is a ghetto. The 
involuntary aspect is a very important dimension. Without the aspect of coercion, the 
area is more appropriately described as an ethnic enclave” (id., ibid.). In other terms, 
“all ghettos are segregated, but not all segregated areas are ghettos. Thus, residential 
segregation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ghettoisation” (id., ibid.). 
 
The degree of spatial segregation of immigrants is variable across the EU. There are 
multiple causes for this variation, including immigrants’ income levels, discrimination 
in the housing market, public housing policies and degree of ethnic closure. The debate 
is whether agency or structural variables are to blame: “while some interpret 
segregation as an outcome of choice (albeit within income constraints), others take a 
structural approach, viewing segregation as a feature of inequalities in power, 
resources and discrimination” (Spencer and Cooper, 2007: 36). All in all, it seems clear 
that national and local specificities are a key variable in this respect. National and local 
history, urban context and institutional arrangements are decisive in explaining 
immigrants’ residential patterns in different cities (Asselin et al., 2006). Several case 
studies carried out on the EU confirm this wide heterogeneity – such as, for example, 
when Northern are compared with Southern cities (Malheiros, 2002). There is also no 
evidence whether segregation is generally increasing or not across the EU space. 
 
Since long ago, segregation is equated with a deficit of integration (Asselin et al., 
2006). However, a challenging theme of recent research concerns its positive aspects. 
First of all, the existence of social problems, such as unemployment and social 
exclusion, is often wrongly associated with segregation. As reminded by Asselin et al. 
(2006: 144-145), “(...) segregation of elite migrants is never classified as a problem (...). 
There is evidence from a lot of European cities that some elite migrant populations 
manifest high levels of segregation”. But more than this, even segregation of low 
income immigrants may not be problematic, enhancing further capabilities of these 
groups to integrate. According to Spencer and Cooper (2007: 38-39), “there is no 
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agreement in the literature on whether segregation is negative for migrants or ethnic 
minorities (...). Some argue that it is the continuing correlation between ethnic 
segregation and deprivation which is the problem (...). Although extreme levels of 
segregation may hinder integration, evidence suggests this may not be the case with 
moderate levels of segregation. Evidence from Amsterdam shows that minorities in 
similar levels of segregation vary in their performance on other indexes of integration 
such as education, employment, social and cultural values and political integration (...). 
Furthermore, ethnic clustering, by facilitating the development of community 
infrastructures and social support networks, can enable migrants to feel a sense of 
belonging”. In short, residential segregation could be a positive aspect of immigrants’ 
lives, if it does not lead to isolation and exclusion from other opportunities and 
networks.  
 
3.3.3. Culture and identity 
 
Culture is a complex and dynamic aspect of immigrants’ lives, reflecting modifications 
over time but also causing further changes. According to Spencer and Cooper (2007: 
7), “cultures among migrants, as among host populations, are diverse - by ethnicity 
and faith but also region, class, gender, age and legal status. Cultural integration 
involves changes in the attitudes and behaviour of migrants and in those of the host 
society (in its impact on the arts and cuisine for instance). The literature focuses 
almost exclusively on changes among migrants”. Oliver Asselin et al. (2006: 137) also 
share from this opinion, stating that policy initiatives assume a more or less linear path 
of “integration”, disregarding the fact that assimilation is not a “one-sided concept” 
and that immigrants have led to changes in European societies. 
 
In general terms, much of the debate around culture evolves around the concepts of 
assimilation and multiculturalism. The notion of assimilation derives from the 
traditional North-American experience. It supposes that the immigrants adapt 
gradually to the host society, by accepting a homogeneous culture practised by the 
majority. Alternatively, the notion of multiculturalism, mostly developed in the 
European context (and also Canada), implies that cultural differences between ethnic 
groups are assumed as long-lasting. Both concepts may be understood at the level of 
actual practices and at the level of policies. In the latter case, they are linked to the 
different models of citizenship and nationhood outlined in a previous section. 
Although sometimes an analysis based on policy objectives may conceal actual cultural 
outcomes, a large body of research was in fact inspired by the policy discussion 
(Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2004; Asselin et al., 2006). 
 
When viewed in detail, both assimilationist and multiculturalist approaches have 
displayed many shortcomings during the years. According to Vertovec and Wessendorf 
(2004), when multiculturalism was developed in Europe, after the 1980s, it 
represented a turn away from classical assimilationist approaches. Both researchers 
and policy makers then agreed that the latter were impracticable at the European 
context, what required the acceptance of cultural diversity. However, after a period 
where multiculturalism prevailed, a return to assimilationism was verified in the new 
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century. Referring to the European experience, Asselin et al. (2006: 134-137) state that 
“(...) the comeback of the term «assimilation» is associated with a growing fear that, 
without staunch policy measures, immigrants and their descendants will not integrate 
and will pose a serious danger to the cohesion of European societies. (…) (There is) a 
growing awareness that minority formation among migrants is leading to and 
reinforcing ethnic stratification, which lends support to positions and policies that are 
critical of cultural pluralism and multiculturalist principles (…)”. Countries such as the 
Netherlands, the UK and Germany are therefore viewed as substituting 
multiculturalism for assimilation, although under the new designation of “integration 
programmes”.   
 
Some research lines prefer changing from a broad discussion about cultural diversity to 
a more specific one, about some of its concrete manifestations, such as religious and 
linguistic diversity (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2004). The latter are crucial areas to 
observe cultural belonging, since they do not only respect to public but also to private 
lives of immigrants, including families and households. Although religious issues are far 
more polemical, EU states have shown a higher degree of acceptance of religious than 
linguistic diversity. As admitted by Kymlicka (1995), this results from the need of 
modern states to build a common language, whilst the separation of state and church 
often occurs in liberal nation-states.  
 
Studies on religious diversity have focused on the growth of religious fundamentalism, 
the confrontation of religious norms with the principles of the liberal nation-state, and 
the importance of secularism in increasingly plural societies. Public manifestations of 
religion have been one area under study. It has been highlighted that they may act as a 
factor strengthening collective belonging and identity, also contributing to the 
management of social problems (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2004). Other studies 
addressed the institutional recognition of religion. In this respect, the recognition of 
religious minorities and the involvement of religious organisations in policymaking, 
particularly at the local level, have had positive impacts on integration.  
 
The growth of Muslim immigrants has been one of the major topics under study. With 
reference to the UK, Spencer and Cooper (2007: 23) state that “(...) Muslims are found 
to be disproportionately young, concentrated in deprived urban areas, more likely to 
live in public housing and to have fewer qualifications. They experience discrimination 
and negative stereotypes on the basis of their faith. The negativity of the Muslim 
experience has led to religion becoming a more important marker of identity for young 
Muslims, who seek recognition in the public sphere based on their faith rather than 
ethnicity”. However, the debate has also evolved around the heterogeneity of Muslim 
communities (they are diverse in terms of cultural background, language and plurality 
of views) and the dynamic character of identities. Therefore, the practice of religion is 
plural and the acceptance of multiple identities (such as European and Muslim) is 
possible (id., ibid.). 
 
Language is another important marker of identity. At least in the first generations of 
immigrants, the maintenance of the original language is seen as vital, whilst for 
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subsequent generations this role is mainly attributed to other cultural artifacts. As 
said, linguistic diversity does not fit so neatly into the principles of EU states than 
religious ones. As explained by Vertovec and Wessendorf (2004: 30), “(…) it is 
justifiable to require an immigrant to learn another language, whereas it is rather 
problematic to ask an immigrant to change his/her religion. Hence, language 
assimilation is generally interpreted to be more compatible with liberal values than 
religious assimilation, because the acquisition of language does not prevent people 
from freely expressing their moral convictions”. This helps to explain why the issue of 
mandatory language courses as a pre-condition to integration has been accepted in 
recent years. In the case of immigrants’ children, the incidence of bilingualism has 
been also object of scrutiny. In spite of the evidence about higher school failure among 
these youngsters, some efforts are still laid down in the building of mechanisms to 
bridge cultural and linguistic difference, favouring the acceptance of multilingual 
contexts in everyday lives (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2004). 
 
The issue of cultural diversity has witnessed recently an important leap with the 
introduction of the notion of “super-diversity” (Vertovec, 2006). Referring to the UK 
context and, particularly, the experience of London, the author argues that diversity of 
national origins and ethnic belonging, among immigrant groups, is no longer enough to 
explain the current dynamics. According to him, “over the past ten years, the nature of 
immigration to Britain has brought with it a transformative «diversification of 
diversity» not just in terms of ethnicities and countries of origin, but also with respect 
to a variety of significant variables that affect where, how and with whom people live. 
These additional variables, which importantly must be seen as mutually conditioning, 
include a differentiation in immigration statuses and their concomitant entitlements 
and restrictions of rights, labour market experiences, gender and age profiles, spatial 
factors, and local area responses by service providers and residents. Rarely are these 
factors described side by side, and often issues of ethnic diversity and the stratification 
of immigrants’ rights are explored separately” (id., ibid.: 1). In sum, “a simple ethnicity-
focused approach to understanding and engaging minority groups in Britain, as taken 
in many models and policies within conventional multiculturalism, is inadequate and 
often inappropriate for dealing with immigrants’ needs or understanding their 
dynamics of inclusion or exclusion” (id., ibid.: 17).  
 
This means that the positioning of immigrants towards the access to resources and life 
chances is an increasingly complex matter. Traditional sociological categories, such as 
labour market incorporation (and social class) and ethnic belonging, were already 
powerful predictors of difference. However, in the case of contemporary immigration, 
other factors now add to the discussion, including – as suggested by Vertovec – legal 
status, gender and age profiles, spatial patterns and policy responses. In an already 








3.3.4. Second generation 
 
Studies about the second generation are crucial to understand immigrants’ 
integration. This mostly results from the time perspective so important in migration 
studies. As known since the classical theories in the field, only a long-term perspective 
may conclude by the success or failure of migration projects. Time is needed to pay off 
the costs of migration, to acquire new human and social capital, and to overcome 
obstacles to integration. Studies on intra-generational and, particularly, inter-
generational mobility are thus crucial in integration processes. Moreover, second 
generations often may acquire the citizenship of the host country – which is, in many 
respects, the main obstacle to integration and participation. Hence their success or 
failure is telling about the way a society is dealing with its new members. Under the 
term “second generation” are usually subsumed the native-born children of 
immigrants (foreign-born parents) and, in some cases, also the children that arrived 
before primary school. Sometimes the term “1.5 generation” is also used to designate 
children arrived very early in their lives or immediately after starting their school 
careers. 
 
Second generations in Europe are still recent. Taking into account the major inflows 
that took place after the 1950s, most of the immigrants’ offspring is still in an early 
stage of its life. The majority of the immigrants´ descendants attended primary school 
in the 1980s and secondary school in the 1990s, and are now entering the labour 
market. This explains why most of the studies until now observed the educational 
attainment and the transition from school to work, but not yet the occupational 
trajectory. This poses some differences compared to the study of second generation in 
traditional immigration countries, such as the United States – although the study of 
the “new second generation” in this last context provides an interesting parallelism 
(King et al., 2006; Thamson and Crul, 2007). As said in a previous section, the early 
stage of these studies in Europe will not conceal its long-lasting future. Immigrants’ 
offspring is an increasing part of the European demography, what means that larger 
generations of children with an immigrant background are entering, year by year, in 
families, schools, work and public life. 
 
The number of studies about the second generation in Europe is increasing. In general, 
they have showed that, in educational terms, immigrants’ children perform worse than 
children with no immigrant background, although better than foreign-born children. 
When observing their early performance at the labour market, they confirmed their 
lowest employment rates, vulnerability to unemployment and lowest access to skilled 
jobs, when compared with native youngsters, although again showing better indicators 
than foreign-born youngsters. These gaps are justified by the low socio-economic 
background from which they come (third country immigrants in the EU are usually 
characterized by low education and/or low socio-economic condition), worse access to 
social networks in the labour market and discrimination (Castles and Miller, 2009: 227-
229). Since many of these descendants acquired national citizenship, the fact that 
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discrimination is not only based on nationality, but also in ethnic origin, explains part 
of the problem 30.  
 
When viewed in detail, the situation of second generations in Europe is however more 
complex (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003; King et al., 2004 and 2006). Many of the recent 
research have highlighted many differences among EU countries and among immigrant 
groups. On the one hand, national contexts explain a large part of the variability in 
integration patterns. This often respects less to immigrant oriented policies than to 
educational and labour market national arrangements, such as type of schooling 
(vocational or non vocational) and access to higher education. On the other hand, 
immigrant communities display heterogeneity and polarization (even when coming 
from the same sending country), between and within EU countries. This means that is 
possible to observe a fraction of second generation youngsters, for example Turks, 
performing well in some EU countries, and risking to become an underclass in others. 
 
Factors affecting second generation outcomes are thus complex. As expressed by King 
et al. (2004: 50), two sets of determinants “(...) shape the integration processes of the 
second generation: external factors, such as levels of discrimination and the degree of 
social and residential segregation; and factors intrinsic to ethnic groups, including the 
ability to access social support networks, level of education and skills, and the amount 
of financial resources available. Intrinsic cultural values, though they risk attributing 
behavioural differences to «culture» alone (…), do offer insights into why certain 
ethnic groups attain higher levels of social mobility than others despite similar socio-
economic backgrounds. An apt example is the value that immigrant parents attach to 
their children’s education”. Comparisons between the EU and other receiving contexts 
are also problematic given the higher European variety. According to the same authors 
(id., ibid.: 52), the theory of “segmented assimilation”, developed at the United States 
to understand recent integration patterns of the second generation, is inadequate at 
the EU since it disregards “(….) differences between European countries in terms of 
education policy, citizenship laws, discourse on immigration and race, and inequalities 
in society as a whole”, as well as internal differences within ethnic groups. 
 
In face of these challenges, several EU cross-national projects have been developed 
during the last years 31. They confirmed the complexity of integration patterns among 
                                                             
30 For example, according to Spencer and Cooper (2007: 23), “a recent edited volume on France finds 
consensus (…) that the French aspiration to equality has not protected ethnic minorities from 
discrimination, for instance in working class jobs, university admissions or central government policy 
making. As a consequence, it finds disadvantaged minorities are increasingly expressing their ethnic 
identity (…)”. 
31
 Among these, two main projects must be taken in account. The first is EFFNATIS –“Effectiveness of 
National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a Comparative European 
Perspective” –, which lasted from 1998-2000. The project, coordinated by Friedrich Heckmann, from the 
European Forum for Migration Studies, University of Bamberg, Germany, and funded by the EU 
Commission under the TSER framework programme, aimed to compare different national integration 
policies and their effect on second-generation integration in six European countries. Taking into account 
that EFFNATIS did not compare the same ethnic groups in different countries, another European project 
emerged in 2003 – TIES, “The Integration of the European Second-Generation”, coordinated by M. Crul 
and J. Schneider, from the Institute of Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), University of Amsterdam, 
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the second generations; the wide variety according to national contexts; some 
contradictory situations within the same groups; differing degrees of ethnic closure; 
and even unexpected variations in time. For example, “the position of second-
generation Turks, Moroccans and other migrant groups varies widely between the 
different countries in Europe, and it is not easy to make an overall assessment of 
trends. The picture is further complicated by the polarizations within ethnic groups 
that exist in some countries. Moreover, if we view the development of different groups 
over time, we do not see a linear process. The Moroccan community, for instance, 
once seemed headed for downward assimilation, but now seems to be rising. This 
underscores the hazards of premature classification” (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003: 982-
983).  
 
An interesting study was recently carried out about the French case (Attias-Donfut and 
Wolff, 2009). It concluded that, in many respects, the integration of immigrants’ 
descendants was being a success. According to the authors, this was an outcome of a 
major change occurring within these families: the “unchaining of generations”. By this 
concept they mean the cultural shock between first generation immigrants and their 
children, since several discontinuities emerge between them: language, culture, family 
values, identity, memory, life experiences and social trajectories. The result is a 
relatively favourable setting for the second generation’s integration, although several 
factors still hinder an easy generalisation. The latter include the socio-economic status 
(which constrains mobility more than cultural and ethnic traits), gender (immigrants’ 
daughters perform better, particularly at school, than sons) and parents behaviour 
(stronger adhesion on the part of immigrants to host society norms and values makes 
easier their children’s integration).   
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Research on immigration in Europe is large and plural. The nature of its object of study 
explains many of its characteristics. Viewed from today, immigration is already a long-
lasting feature of European societies. Immigrants entered mostly after the end of the 
Second World War and, from then on, never ceased their flow. The national origins, 
educational background, occupational profile, immigration strategy, culture and 
identity largely varied, as much as their specific destination. One after another, all 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and funded by several European institutions (see 
http://www.tiesproject.eu/component/option,com_frontpage/Itemid,1/lang,en). This latter limited its 
comparative dimension to the study of three distinct immigrant communities – the Turkish, Moroccan 
and ex-Yugoslavian second-generation (for some results see, for example, Crul, 2008). More recently, 
another two projects took place in the European context: TRESEGY and EU MARGINS, both funded by 
the EU. The first, TRESEGY – “Toward a Social Construction of an European Youthness: Experience of 
inclusion and exclusion in the public sphere among second generation migrated teenagers”, was 
coordinated by Luca Queirolo Palmas (University of Genoa, Italy), and lasted from 2006-2009. The 
second, EU MARGINS – “On the Margins of the European Community - Adult Immigrants in Seven 
European Countries (Spain, UK, Italy, France, Estonia, Sweden and Norway)”, funded by the EC 7th 
Framework Programme and coordinated by Max J. Demuth (Oslo University, Norway) and will last from 




North, Western and Southern European countries became countries of destination – 
even when also sending ones –, and Central and Eastern European countries are now 
also involved. Europe is now a mosaic of immigrants, whose numbers do not lag much 
behind traditional immigration countries, whose patterns are not easily categorised, 
and whose structural role in future European societies is undeniable. 
 
The different facets of immigration in the EU have been the object of numerous 
studies. In this review, three major areas were identified: policy issues, family related 
issues and integration patterns. In each, a brief synthesis of the main research trends 
and findings was tentatively made. The main sub-themes addressed were: in the policy 
area, admission and control policies, integration measures and citizenship models; in 
the family area, demographic impacts, family migration, gender and age related 
migration; and, in the integration field, labour market incorporation, spatial 
distribution, identity issues and second generations. The picture that stands out is a 
complex one, resisting to a simple summary. Policy initiatives were multiple and ever-
changing, as the immigration context and policy framework varied. Family patterns 
were heterogeneous, adding to the pre-existing richness of family diversity in Europe. 
Integration patterns were complex, balancing between (formal) equality and 
stratification, and between assimilation and continuous difference. All this is more 
intricate when the different national contexts of reception are taken in mind, as well as 
the different characteristics of immigrants received in each European nation. 
 
The changing patterns of international migration at the turn of the century add further 
challenges to its study. Currently, new forms of mobility are becoming common, 
surpassing the traditional settlement migration known until recently. Temporary and 
seasonal migration became common, as well as a frequent circulation and the holding 
of multiple interests in multiple countries. The notion of transnationalism received vast 
attention in the last few years (Vertovec, 2008). Different aspects of transnationalism 
have been highlighted in this report, including political (dual citizenship), familial 
(transnational families), economic (remittances, entrepreneurship) and identity-
related issue. This means that individuals’ lives no longer remain attached to one single 
location (and country), as was admitted by classical migration theory and social 
research. 
 
Despite the abundant literature on migration issues developed over the last decades in 
Europe, the gaps existing in current research are still many. A comprehensive overview 
of some themes deserving further attention has been already made by some other 
states of the art in this field (see, for example, Penninx et al., 2006 and 2008; Spencer 
and Cooper, 2007). In the following paragraphs, only a brief summary of some 
research gaps will be made below, mainly referring to family and integration issues.  
 
The first and foremost need is of more complete and comparative data. As seen above, 
data on immigration in the EU is currently limited.  Concepts and sources vary, and 
several areas are badly captured. Beyond the description of some major variables, an 
in-depth comparative study of immigrants’ characteristics, families and the second 
generation is hardly allowed under the current datasets. Longitudinal studies, that 
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allow an understanding of the mobility experience, are also generally not available. As 
reminded by Spencer and Cooper (2007), the lack of statistics on many areas, the use 
of different criteria to identify migrants, and even the use of different concepts to 
mean overlapping issues (for example, integration, cohesion and inclusion), make it 
difficult to compare immigration and integration across the EU 32. 
 
At the policy level, some of the areas deserving better scrutiny are the impact of family 
reunification on immigrants’ strategies (settlement, integration and participation); the 
impact of specific legislation on the family life (spouse’s access to employment, right to 
social housing, right to public education and health services); the consequences of 
recent policy restrictions for family reunification and formation; and the use of 
irregular channels by family members for immigration and integration. In other words, 
the role of the family reunification and family formation channels, of family support 
measures and of the family itself as a mechanism for integration is still understudied 
(Spencer and Cooper 2007). The mechanisms providing full citizenship, as well as their 
outcomes, could also be more thoroughly studied. A deeper analysis is still to be done 
on the reasons why naturalization and dual citizenship are used (or not) by immigrants 
and their offspring; their outcomes on individuals’ lives and prospects, both at the 
destination and the sending countries; and the effects of (limited) political 
participation on immigrants’ integration. 
 
At the family level, much more research is needed on immigrants’ families and changes 
resulting from migration. Some of themes meriting further attention are related with 
family strategies: these include the role of families in migration decisions; the 
constraints exerted by the economic and policy framework on collective strategies; 
and the role of the family in promoting the overall integration of its members 
(including descendants). Other themes deserving study are related with family 
structures: this is mainly the case of transnational families, marriage migration and 
mixed marriages. The latter could be observed under the perspective of its national 
and cultural combinations; its impact on relationships, children and host country 
attitudes; and the difference between contacts started in the host country and in a 
foreign context (for example, EU citizens travelling, studying and working abroad). 
Finally, also changes within the family resulting from immigration (for example, 
conflicts about women roles) could be further analysed. In general, it may be argued 
that family migration was much less studied than other related issues, such as gender 
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 Besides the full implementation of the EC Regulation on migration statistics produced in 2007 (see 
above), a study funded under the 6TH Framework Programme may overcome some of these problems. 
The objective of this study – PROMINSTAT – is “to promote comparative quantitative research in the 
field of migration and integration”, providing an online database for 27 European countries (25 EU, plus 
Norway and Switzerland). The project, started in 2007, is coordinated by Albert Kraler, from the 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development Research and Policy (RaP), Vienna (see 
http://www.prominstat.eu/drupal/?q=node/64). 




With regard to gender, the most needed work seems to be on immigrant men. As 
written by King et al. (2004: 41), “we recommend attention be paid to the connections 
between migration processes and the construction of masculinity: this reflects the 
view that constructions of masculinity have not been given due regard within 
anthropology and the social sciences”. Eventual changes in masculinity may both affect 
immigrants and the non-migrant population staying in the host country. Also deserving 
attention are the impacts of transnational family arrangements on women (and men)’s 
lives. The enactment of transnational support may be gendered, affecting differentially 
family members. With regard to age related migration, more study is needed on 
student migration and retirement migration, including, in the latter, the existence of 
multiple residences. 
 
At the integration level, a vast area of research remains to be done. With regard to the 
labour market, more studies are needed about immigrants’ professional mobility; 
linkages between work and integration (in the sense of inclusion or structural 
exclusion); employers’ recruitment strategies; role of social networks in providing 
employment and mobility; entrepreneurship; and (mostly in the current recession) 
strategies to overcome unemployment. With regard to cities and residential 
segregation, themes to be explored are the subjective experiences of immigrants (and 
second generations) at the local level; strategies of landlords to take profit of 
immigrants housing needs and policy regulations; immigrants’ strategies in the housing 
domain, including residential mobility; relationship between residential segregation 
and integration; spatial accessibility to education resources and health care systems; 
and spatial mobility of the second generation. With regard to culture and identity, 
themes calling for further exploration include the impact of immigrants on the host 
society’ culture; the evolution of cultural difference and multiculturalism; the possible 
combination of cultural (including religious and linguistic) differences and overall 
integration (differences may not conceal integration in an already highly complex and 
differentiated host society); the role of religions other than Islam in influencing the 
integration process; the conflict between religion and secularism; the reasons and 
outcomes of the immigrants (and second generation)’s attachment to their original 
language; the role of immigrants (and second generation)’s cultural productions as 
forms of political expression; and the ongoing discrimination on cultural and ethnic 
grounds. Finally, with regard to the second generation, research is needed on its 
performance at the education system; mobility within the labour market; and the 
impact of irregular immigrants’ conditions over their children life chances. 
 
In sum, migration research is an area of rich past and promising future in the EU. Since 
immigration became part and parcel of European societies, immigrants and their 
offspring are becoming a structural aspect of European populations. Moreover, much 
of the recent social change has resulted from migration – and the future study of 
immigration and its outcomes will be rightly equated with the study of Europe itself. 
The variety in policy issues, family life and integration patterns will be partly a heritage 
of a former Europe, in which international migration was not an issue, and partly the 
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1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Australia .. 8,8 9,2 8,9 1 6,9 5,6 7,3 5 3,9 2 3,1 5,9 5,3 3,9 4,8 5,5 5,8 7 5,6 5,5 5,3 6,7 7,7 ..
Austria .. -0,2 1,4 1,5 -3,3 1,2 0,7 7,6 9,9 9,1 4,2 0,4 0,3 0,5 0,2 1,1 2,5 2,2 4,1 4,2 4,4 6,2 5,9 3,3 4
Belgium .. 0,5 3,3 0,9 2,5 -0,3 - 3 3,4 3,3 2,9 2,9 2,7 2,4 1,9 2,1 2,7 2,5 3,4 4 3,9 4,2 4,5 4,8 ..
Canada .. 2,4 4,4 3,1 7 5,8 2,6 6,5 4,3 6,1 5 5,2 5,5 5,6 5,2 3,9 5,2 6,5 7,9 6,9 6,5 6,4 6,8 6,6 ..
Czech Republic 0,4 0,7 0,4 -0,4 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,3 1,1 0,5 1 1 1 1,2 0,9 0,9 0,6 -0,8 1,2 2,5 1,8 3,5 3,4 8,1
Denmark -1,8 0,7 - 2,4 -1,8 - 1,8 1,6 2,1 2,1 2,1 1,9 5,5 3,2 2,3 2,1 1,7 1,7 2,2 1,7 1,1 0,9 1,2 1,8 4,2
Finland .. -2 -4,6 -7,8 -0,8 -0,2 0,6 1,4 2,6 1,6 1,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,8 0,6 0,6 0,4 1,2 1 1,2 1,3 1,7 1,9 2,5
France .. 3,1 2,3 3,5 0,3 0,8 0,7 1,4 1,6 1,6 1,2 0,9 0,7 0,6 0,7 0,8 1 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,5 1,1
Germany .. 6,1 5,8 9,3 -3,2 5,1 1,5 16.3 | 7,5 9,6 5,7 3,9 4,9 3,4 1,1 0,6 2,5 2 3,3 2,7 1,7 1 1 0,3 0,5
Greece .. -3,5 -4,7 -4,4 6,5 5,2 0,6 6,3 11,7 9,1 8,3 7,4 7,3 6,6 5,7 5,1 4.1 | 2,7 3,5 3,5 3,3 3,7 3,5 3,6 ..
Hungary 0,4 0,1 0,1 -0,2 -0,1 -0,7 -2,1 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1.7 | 1 0,4 1,6 1,8 1,7 1,9 1,4
Iceland .. -1,7 .. -7,3 -1,8 -2,2 -2,1 -3,9 4,3 -0,8 -0,4 -2,6 -2,6 -2,6 0,3 3,2 4 6,1 3,4 -1 -0,5 1,8 13 17,3 12,6
Ireland .. -14,5 -7,6 -1 5,3 -0,3 -9,3 -2,2 1,4 0,5 -0,9 -0,8 1,6 4,6 5,1 4,5 6,4 8,4 10 8,4 7,8 11,6 15,9 .. ..
Italy .. -1,9 -3 -0,9 -0,2 0,1 -0,5 0,2 0,1 3.2 | 3,2 2,6 1,6 2,6 2,2 1,6 1,8 3,1 2.2 | 6,1 10,6 9,6 5,2 6,4 ..
Japan .. -0,3 - -0,1 - - - - 0,3 0,3 -0,1 -0,7 -0,4 -0,1 0,1 0,3 -0,1 0.3 | -0,4 0,5 -0,3 -0,4 - - ..
Luxembourg .. 1,6 5,4 2,9 9,8 3,8 2,5 10,2 10,8 11 10,6 9,9 11,2 8,9 9 9,6 10,9 8,2 2,5 5,8 12 9,6 13,1 11,4 12,5
Netherlands .. -1,1 1,5 2,5 5,3 3,7 1,7 4 4,2 3,8 3,9 2,4 2,1 2,8 3,1 3,9 3,8 4,5 4,3 3,4 2,2 1,2 0,6 0,6 1,6
New Zealand .. 2,4 6,1 0,3 4 -7,4 -5,8 2.7 | 1,8 1,3 3,9 5,5 7,7 6,6 2 -1,7 -2,3 -2,9 2,5 9,7 8,7 3,7 1,7 3,6 1,4
Norway .. -1,4 -0,5 -0,3 1,2 1 1,4 0,5 1,9 2,3 3 1,6 1,4 1,4 2,5 3,2 4,3 2 1,8 3,7 2,4 2,8 3,9 5,1 8,5
Poland 0,1 -0,7 -0,8 -0,4 -0,2 -0,6 -0,5 -0,4 -0,4 -0,3 -0,4 -0,5 -0,5 -0,3 -0,3 -0,3 -0.4 | -0,5 -0,4 -0,5 -0,4 -0,2 -0,3 -0,9 -0,5
Portugal .. -4,3 -14 -16,5 38,2 4,3 -1,9 -3,9 -2 -0,5 1,6 1,7 2,2 2,6 2,9 3,2 3,7 4,6 6,3 6,8 6,1 4,5 3,6 .. ..
Slovak Republic -1,2 -2 -1,6 -1 -0,7 -0,6 -0,6 -0,4 - -0,6 0,3 0,9 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,5 0,6 0,7 1,3
Spain -3 -5,2 -1,2 -0,4 1 -1,7 0,4 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,9 1,3 1,6 3,1 4,9 8,9 10,1 15,7 14,5 14,7 15 14,2 16
Sweden .. 1,5 4,4 6,1 2,1 1,2 1,3 4,1 2,8 2,3 3,7 5,8 1,2 0,7 0,7 1,2 1,6 2,8 3,3 3,5 3,2 2,8 3 5,6 5,9
Switzerland 5,7 4,2 -0,3 -2,9 -9,1 2,7 2,1 8,4 9.0 | 5,8 5,7 4,4 2,1 -0,8 -1 0,2 2,3 2,8 5,8 6,7 5,9 5,4 4,8 4,7 9
Turkey .. .. .. .. 1,5 0,3 2,1 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,5 1,5 - - - - - - .. ..
United Kingdom .. 2,1 -0,8 -0,3 -0,8 -0,6 1,6 1,2 1,3 -0,1 0,3 0,8 1 0,9 0,9 1,7 2,3 2,5 2,5 2,5 .. .. .. .. ..
United States .. 1,8 1,9 2,1 2,1 3,2 2,7 3,1 5,1 5,1 4,5 4,2 4,4 4,6 4,8 4,2 4,4 4,6 4,2 4,1 3,4 3,4 3,6 3,7 3,4
EU27 total .. .. -0,2 -1,7 0,8 1,3 0,3 1,4 1,1 2 1,6 1,2 1,4 1,2 0,9 1,1 2 1,5 1,2 3,8 4,2 3,8 3,4 3,3 3,8
Chile .. .. .. .. .. -1 -0,6 1,3 .. .. .. .. 0,8 .. .. .. .. 0,4 .. .. .. .. 0,4 .. ..
Estonia .. .. .. .. .. 4,3 4,3 -2,6 -5,1 -22,1 -9,2 -5,2 -5,7 -4 -1,8 -0,8 -0,4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Israel .. .. .. .. .. 4,5 -1,1 40,3 33 11,8 10 11,8 11,9 10,4 9,2 8,2 11,9 9,8 6,2 3,3 1,6 2 2,4 2,4 2,1
Russian Federation .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,4 3,5 3,5 2,9 1,8 2,5 1,9 1,6 0,6 0,7 0,9 1,1 ..




Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics  
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1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Australia  23,0  23,2  23,1  23,0  23,1  23,2  23,4  23,6  23,8  24,1 .. .. .. .. ..  7,4 .. .. .. .. ..  7,7
Austria ..  11,2  10,9  10,5  11,1  10,8  11,4  13,0  13,5  14,1  8,5  8,6  8,6  8,6  8,7  8,8  8,9  9,2  9,4  9,5  9,7  9,9
Belgium  9,7  10,0  10,2  10,3  10,8  11,1  11,4  11,7  12,1  12,5  9,0  9,0  8,9  8,7  8,8  8,4  8,2  8,2  8,3  8,4  8,6  8,8
Canada  17,2  17,8  18,0  18,1  18,4  18,7  19,0  19,2  19,5  19,8 .. .. .. .. ..  5,3 .. .. .. .. ..  6,0
Czech Republic ..  4,3  4,4  4,2  4,4  4,6  4,7  4,9  5,1  5,5  1,5  1,9  2,0  2,1  2,2  1,9  2,0  2,3  2,4  2,5  2,7  3,1
Denmark  4,8  5,4  5,6  5,8  6,0  6,2  6,3  6,3  6,5  6,6  4,2  4,7  4,7  4,8  4,9  4,8  5,0  4,9  5,0  4,9  5,0  5,1
Finland  2,0  2,4  2,5  2,6  2,7  2,8  2,9  3,2  3,4  3,6  1,3  1,4  1,6  1,6  1,7  1,8  1,8  1,9  2,0  2,1  2,2  2,3
France .. ..  7,3  7,4  7,5  7,7  7,8  8,0  8,1  8,3 .. .. .. ..  5,6 .. .. .. .. ..  5,6 ..
Germany  11,5  12,2  12,4  12,5  12,6  12,8  12,9 .. .. ..  8,8  8,9  9,0  8,9  8,9  8,9  8,9  8,9  8,9  8,2  8,2  8,2
Greece .. .. .. ..  10,3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  2,8  2,6  2,9  3,4  4,1  4,5  5,0  5,2  5,3
Hungary  2,8  2,8  2,9  2,9  3,0  3,0  3,0  3,2  3,3  3,4  1,4  1,4  1,4  1,4  1,5  1,1  1,1  1,1  1,3  1,4  1,5  1,6
Ireland ..  7,8  8,2  8,7  9,3  10,0  10,8  11,6  12,7  14,4  2,7  3,2  3,1  3,0  3,1  3,3  4,0  4,8  5,6  5,5  6,3 ..
Italy .. .. .. ..  2,5 .. .. .. .. ..  1,7  2,0  2,1  2,1  2,2  2,4  2,5  2,6  3,9  4,2  4,6  5,0
Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  1,1  1,1  1,2  1,2  1,2  1,3  1,4  1,5  1,5  1,5  1,6  1,6
Korea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  0,2  0,3  0,3  0,3  0,4  0,4  0,5  0,6  1,0  1,0  1,1  1,4
Luxembourg  30,9  32,2  32,8  33,2  32,8  32,9  33,0  33,2  33,8  34,8  33,4  34,1  34,9  35,6  36,0  37,3  37,5  38,1  38,6  39,3  40,4  41,6
Mexico  0,4 .. ..  0,5 .. .. .. ..  0,4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Netherlands  9,1  9,6  9,8  10,1  10,4  10,6  10,7  10,6  10,6  10,6  4,7  4,4  4,3  4,2  4,1  4,2  4,3  4,3  4,3  4,3  4,2  4,2
New Zealand ..  16,5  16,8  17,2  18,0  18,7  19,2  19,6  20,5  21,2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Norway  5,5  6,1  6,5  6,8  6,9  7,3  7,6  7,8  8,2  8,7  3,8  3,7  3,6  3,6  3,7  4,0  4,1  4,1  4,3  4,6  4,8  5,1
Poland .. .. .. .. ..  1,6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  0,1 .. .. ..  0,1
Portugal  5,4  5,1  5,1  5,1  6,3  6,7  6,7  6,8  6,3  6,1  1,7  1,7  1,8  1,8  1,9  2,1  3,5  4,1  4,3  4,5  4,1  4,1
Slovak Republic .. .. .. ..  2,5  2,7  3,2  3,9  4,6  5,6  0,4  0,5  0,5  0,5  0,5  0,5  0,5  0,5  0,5  0,4  0,5  0,6
Spain ..  3,2  3,7  4,9  6,4  8,0  8,8  10,3  11,1  11,9 .. ..  1,6  1,9  2,3  3,4  4,9  6,4  7,2  8,7  9,5  10,3
Sweden  10,5  11,0  11,8  11,3  11,5  11,8  12,0  12,2  12,4  12,9  6,0  6,0  5,9  5,6  5,5  5,4  5,3  5,3  5,3  5,3  5,3  5,4
Switzerland  21,4  21,4  21,6  21,9  22,3  22,8  23,1  23,5  23,8  24,1  18,9  18,9  19,0  19,0  19,2  19,3  19,7  19,9  20,0  20,2  20,3  20,3
Turkey .. .. ..  1,9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
United Kingdom  6,9  7,4  7,6  7,9  8,2  8,6  8,9  9,3  9,7  10,1  3,4  3,4  3,6  3,8  3,8  4,0  4,4  4,5  4,7  4,9  5,2  5,8
United States  9,3  10,8  10,6  11,0  11,3  12,3  12,6  12,8  12,9  13,0  6,0 .. .. .. ..  6,6 .. .. .. .. .. 7,4
Chile .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  1,2 .. .. .. ..
Estonia .. .. ..  18,4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  6,9 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Slovenia ..  10,4  10,8  10,8  10,9  10,9  11,0  10,9  11,1  11,3  2,4  2,2  2,1  1,7  2,1  2,1  2,3  2,2  2,3  2,2 .. ..
Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics
Foreign-born population Foreign population
Foreign-born and foreign populations






Low education Intermediate 
education
High education Low education Intermediate 
education
High education
Austria 47,7 75,6 88,0 51,4 68,2 74,8
Belgium 41,1 66,6 83,7 35,2 53,3 72,9
Canada 50,6 75,5 82,7 51,6 68,9 77,4
Czech Republic 22,9 72,0 84,0 33,1 67,5 79,8
Denmark 61,5 81,0 87,8 49,3 63,2 78,9
Finland 47,4 73,6 85,6 42,4 65,8 72,9
France 46,5 69,8 79,3 49,1 60,6 68,8
Germany 43,0 72,4 87,8 47,0 64,3 71,3
Greece 48,6 61,4 82,7 65,8 65,6 73,3
Hungary 27,5 65,2 81,3 36,9 59,8 77,3
Ireland 48,9 73,7 86,8 49,9 72,7 80,2
Italy 45,1 67,6 78,6 59,0 70,2 73,9
Luxembourg 37,8 62,5 85,6 61,5 65,2 83,4
Netherlands 60,7 80,5 87,2 44,6 64,2 75,2
Norway 56,4 80,4 89,4 49,1 68,5 84,6
Poland 23,3 58,4 81,9 16,3 32,9 59,9
Portugal 65,9 63,5 84,5 67,5 71,3 84,4
Slovak Republic 14,5 67,5 83,9 .. 58,4 78,7
Spain 55,3 65,9 81,9 63,8 73,6 75,3
Sweden 54,7 81,1 88,3 47,0 66,5 74,3
Switzerland 55,3 80,7 92,7 63,3 74,4 81,9
Turkey 41,8 50,2 72,7 40,4 56,8 73,0
United States 35,2 71,7 83,7 62,3 71,6 78,8
OECD average 44,9 70,3 84,4 49,4 64,5 76,1
Slovenia 40,1 69,8 88,3 57,5 69,2 78,8
Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics
Table 3
Employment rates of native-born and foreign-born population by educational attainment, 2006




Employment of foreign-born by sector, 2003-2004 (average)






















Austria 1,2 22,3 8,8 14,4 12,0 4,2 8,8 (0.4) 2,9 25,0
Belgium 1,2 17,3 6,9 13,6 7,4 6,2 10,7 0,6 9,1 27,1
Canada (2003) 1,2 19,8 6,0 14,1 7,8 5,5 9,6 .. 3,6 32,5
Czech Republic 3,7 29,9 8,8 18,2 4,6 5,1 6,1 .. 4,5 18,9
Finland .. 20,1 5,1 14,5 8,9 6,8 13,6 .. .. 26,9
France 1,9 14,6 10,3 11,9 5,9 6,0 9,7 5,8 6,8 27,2
Germany 1,3 32,0 6,4 12,9 7,6 3,9 10,1 0,7 3,3 21,9
Greece 6,1 16,3 27,3 11,4 9,2 2,7 2,4 13,4 1,4 9,7
Ireland 2,2 16,6 8,4 11,5 13,2 6,4 12,5 .. 2,9 25,4
Japan 0,5 58,7 1,8 13,1
(1)
.. .. .. .. 25,9
Luxembourg 1,0 10,5 16,0 12,2 6,0 1,9 6,3 4,2 12,2 29,8
Netherlands (2002) 1,5 20,4 4,5 15,0 8,2 5,4 12,2 .. 4,6 28,2
Norway .. 13,7 4,5 12,6 8,6 8,0 20,7 .. 3,7 27,0
Spain 6,0 13,6 16,3 12,2 12,0 3,6 3,7 12,2 2,0 18,5
Sweden 0,6 17,2 2,7 12,1 6,6 10,8 18,6 .. 3,9 27,5
Switzerland 1,1 19,7 8,4 15,2 7,3 6,1 13,4 1,3 3,4 24,1
United Kingdom 0,4 11,8 4,3 13,6 9,0 8,4 14,5 1,0 5,2 31,9
United States 2,5 14,3 9,6 13,0 11,9 16,4 2,5 26,6
Note: The numbers in bold indicate the sectors where foreign-born are over-represented (i.e., the share of foreign-born employment in the sector is larger than the share of 
           foreign-born employment in total employment). The sign "-" indicates that the estimate is not reliable enough for publication.
































































































































































Net migrat ion (left  scale) Natural increase (left  scale) Share of net migrat ion in populat ion growth (right scale)
Note :  Data for Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal , Spain and Turkey are for 2005.








Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics
Foreign-born population, 2006 or latest available year


















Source: OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2008
Figure 3



















Permanent-type immigration by category of inflow, 2006
Percentage of total inflows





























              Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics





















































             Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics
Foreign-born unemployment rate relative to native-born unemployment rate, 2006
Figure 7
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